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REPORT OF THE INDIANA STATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ECONOMY ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE IN INDIANA*
A.

'

PREFACE *

The 1933 General Assembly by Joint Resolution provided for the appointment by the Governor of a non-partisan Committee of ten "to accumulate all
pertinent data relative to the functions and organization of state, county,
township, city and town government, school corporations and other municipal
corporations and cause a scientific study thereof to be made, for the purpose
of developing, preparing and recommending to the public and to succeeding
sessions of the General Assembly of this State such laws as will insure,
respectively, economy, proper integration of functions among the various
governmental units, efficiency in organization and financial support of such
governmental units."
The committee was organized January 30, 1934, and consisted of the
following persons: Earl Beck, Indianapolis; Austin V. Clifford, Indianapolis; Bernard C. Gavit, Bloomington; Mrs. Walter Greenough, Indianapolis; Edward C. Hoffman, Brazil; Florence K. Kirlin, Indianapolis; Harry
Miesse, Indianapolis; Fred Millis, Indianapolis; John Nixon, Centerville;
David E. Ross, Lafayette. Miss Kirlin resigned in October, to accept a position in Washington, and Mrs. Thomas D. Sheerin of Indianapolis was
appointed to fill the vacancy. Professor R. Clyde White, Indianapolis, was
elected Executive Secretary of the Committee.
The committee later divided up its work into seven fields: Public Welfare, Transportation, State Government, State Financial Administration,
Local Government, Education and Administration of Justice. Sub-committees
were created and charged with responsibility for each field. The subcommittee in charge of the Administration of Justice consisted of Austin
V. Clifford and Bernard C. Gavit. The C. W. A. and later the F. E. R. A.
placed at the disposal of this committee Mr. Ralph 0. Jarvis who made a
thorough statistical study of the work of the courts in Indiana and their
cost. It is impossible to publish that study in the Law Journal, but it will
be published in full about December 1, 1934, when the entire report of
the general committee will be published by the State.
The materials and recommendations in the first part of the following report
are based upon that study. The language of the report is largely that of
Mr. Austin V. Clifford, although the entire committee has acted favorably on
*This report is published in the Indiana Law Journal for the information of the
members of the Indiana State Bar Association through the courtesy of the Governor
of the State of Indiana.
** The preface to this report was prepared by Dean Bernard C. Gavit of the Indiana
University School of Law, a member of the Indiana State Committee on Governmental
Economy.
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the report, after a public hearing, and the recommendations have been
concurred in by the Indiana State Committee on Governmental Economy.
The sub-committee secured the services of Professor James J. Robinson of
the Indiana University School of Law in connection with the report on
Criminal Procedure, and most of the recommendations in this field were
suggested by him. The services of Professor Ernest H. Shideler of Franklin
College was secured for a study of the state police administration. Such a
study was made, and the report of the committee includes it. It is not printed
at this time partly because of a lack of space and partly because the materials
in the other part of the report are of more direct interest to the lawyers of
the State in their professional capacity. The balance of the report is printed
in the Law Journal at this time as it concerns every lawyer in the State, and
it is possible in this manner to publish the report prior to the lvid-Winter
meeting of the State Bar Association, at which time it will be presented to
that body.
B. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED
The sub-committee has felt that the statute authorizing the creation of the
general committee, while in terms broad enough to require a study of governmental efficiency regardless of cost, was none the less intended by the
legislature as a mandate to the committee to make, if possible, recommendations which would result in a reduction of the cost of government to the
taxpayers of Indiana, and the work of the sub-committee has been done with
this in mind. But in connection with the administration of justice, it must be
remembered that many groups are interested apart from the taxpayer and
that the interest of these other interested groups must not be sacrificed.
The field assigned to the sub-committee on the administration of justice
includes the police, sheriffs, prosecuting attorneys, coroners, and other law
enforcing officers of the state, and the courts, but does not include the fields
of probation, penology and parole, which are a part of the studies undertaken
by the committee on public welfare.
The statement of the field assigned to this sub-committee shows that three
groups are primarily interested in the administration of justice.
The first group consists of the taxpayers, who must ultimately bear the
expense of administration of justice over and above the fines, fees and expenses collected by the courts or law-enforcing officers.
The second group vitally interested in the courts consists of the litigants
themselves, whether the litigation in which they are involved be civil or
criminal. So far as the litigants are concerned, their chief concern is not the
cost of the courts, but their efficiency and the quality of justice administered
therein. In the broader sense, the cost of legal proceedings is far beyond
the sums expended by the taxpayers thereon. It includes the cost of counsel,
the expense of procuring witnesses and evidence, and the losses suffered by
one party or another as a result of the litigation, which far exceed the direct
cost to the taxpayers of the machinery of the administration of justice. These
are the major items in the cost of justice, are not directly related to court
procedure, are beyond the control of courts or legislation, and probably must
be borne by the litigants regardless of any changes in procedure which could
be recommended. The sub-committee has felt that, since these major costs of
justice borne by litigants far exceed the costs borne by the taxpayer, care
should be taken not to recommend changes which would result in the impairment of the efficiency of the courts, and thereby render even greater the
unavoidable cost to litigants.
The third group concerned with the administration of justice is the general
public. While at first thought it might seem that this group is identical with
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the taxpayer, group analysis will disclose that the two groups are not at all
coextensive. The taxpayers represent a distinctly smaller group than the
general public. The members of the public who are not taxpayers-generally
the poorer citizens in the larger communities-come frequently in contact with
the administration of justice through inferior criminal courts and juvenile
courts. They suffer many minor civil wrongs for which there should be some
redress, but for which such redress is impracticable under the present method
of administering justice because of the expense of putting the machinery of
the law into action. Inasmuch as this portion of the general public not comprehended in the group of taxpayers is often, by necessity, involved in court
procedure, and inasmuch as the disrespect for our law fostered in the poorer
communities often results in the development of criminals, the sub-committee
believes that it would be true economy for taxpayers to bear the cost of more
thorough criminal justice for minor offenses and of a small claims court for
the redress of minor civil wrongs, to the end that respect for the law and its
processes be restored in the less fortunate classes of citizens.
It was with the general purpose of effecting all possible economies for the
taxpayer without reducing the efficiency of the administration of justice, so
far as litigants are concerned, or of destroying respect for the law in the
minds of the general public, that the sub-committee considered the recommendations hereinafter made, and consciously made certain recommendations in
the interest of the taxpayer, others in the interest of the litigants, etc.
C.

I.

RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE INTEREST OF THE TAXPAYERS

StatisticalMaterialAvailable.

At the beginning of its studies, the sub-committee found itself hampered
by the lack of statistical material available in the State of Indiana over a substantial period of time. The Statistical Department of the Legislative Reference Bureau compiles a statistical report of the State of Indiana annually.
The report of the work of the courts for the calendar year 1930 is published
in the "Statistical Report for the State of Indiana for the year ending September 30, 1931," which was actually published sometime in the middle of
the year 1932, so that all the material is at least eighteen months old when
published. The statistical report of the work of the courts for the year 1931
(the latest now available) is published in the "Statistical Report for the
State of Indiana for the year ending September 30, 1932," which was actually
printed sometime in the summer of 1933. These reports contain only the
gross sums spent for the administration of justice and require considerable
computation from the report to work out such sums. The figures contained
in the statistical report of the work done by the courts are more helpful than
the figures relating to costs. While the figures contained in these statistical
reports are helpful in so far as they go, they were not sufficiently detailed,
especially with respect to costs, to afford the committee a basis for making
recommendations which might effect economies in the administration of justice. For this reason, the committee undertook, through qualified investigators
available to it, a detailed investigation of costs during the calendar year 1932.
The work of compiling judicial statistics is not a simple one, due to many
difficulties arising in classification. In an effort to bring some order out of
the chaos existing, a special committee of the American Bar Association made
a report in 1932 recommending certain classifications in regard to criminal
offenses. (See 57 Reports of American Bar Association, pp. 638-648 inclusive.) The report of the National Commission on Law Observance and Law
Enforcement (pp. 188-189) states the requirements of satisfactory judicial
statistics. No study has apparently been made of satisfactory statistics for
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comparison of the work of civil courts. To quote briefly from the report
of the National Commission on Law Enforcement, satisfactory statistics on
the administration of justice "* * * must be comprehensive, comparable and
accurate and must provide for a reasonable degree of classification of costs
and must supply the data for making allocations of costs between the criminal
functions and the civil or administrative functions of those law enforcement
agencies which exercise both."
The sub-committee has found that the statistics available in this state are
chiefly deficient in not providing a reasonable classification of expenditures
and in lack of accuracy. As to the lack of reasonable classification, it is
apparent that in order to make an intelligent statistical comparison of any
group of expenditures it is necessary that the expenditures of each office be
listed in such detail that the salaries of each officer and his assistants, the
amounts expended for office supplies, office equipment, for transportation, and
the like, be shown, rather than to group the expenditures into such broad
classifications as "personal services" and "all other expenses," or, worse yet,
to report simply the amount spent for the offices in total, as county auditors
report to the state at present. These figures, showing simply the total amount
spent for the county office, are the only ones available to the Statistical Department of the Legislative Reference Bureau, so that it is obviously impossible for this Bureau to detail the figures in its statistical report. Under the
present budget law (Burns Supp. 1929, Sec. 14239; Baldwin's Ind. Stat.
1934, Sec. 15735) the county officials are required, at the beginning of the
fiscal year, to formulate and publish a budget on forms prescribed by the
State Board of Accounts, showing in detail the proposed expenditures for
the fiscal year, and the auditor is required to "keep separate accounts of each
item of appropriation made by the council and he shall not suffer any such
item to be overdrawn" (2 Burns R. S. 1926, Sec. 5884, Baldwin's Ind. Stat.
1934, Sec. 5387). If the county officers carried out their functions under this
law there should be available without undue difficulty an itemized list of all
expenditures involved in the administration of justice within a relatively
short time after the closing of the calendar year, and certainly such material
could be reported to the Statistical Department of the Legislative Reference
Bureau or to the State Board of Accounts. The State Board of Accounts
conducts an audit and reports on expenditures in great detail, but these audits
are at present from one to three years behind. Moreover, the State Board
of Accounts concerns itself solely with moneys received, and takes no account
of funds due but not collected and no account of the quantity of goods or
services received for the funds expended. It is quite apparent to the subcommittee that if any intelligent progress is to be made in the analysis of
the work accomplished by courts and in the reduction of the cost of administration of justice, some agency such as a judicial council should be established
by statute in Indiana which would continuously function in the investigation
and compilation of statistics relating to both work accomplished by courts
and the cost thereof.
In reference to the accuracy of the reports made by county officials, the
sub-committee has found that the reports are quite unsatisfactory. The
Statistical Department of the Legislative Reference Bureau, in order to compile a 'statistical report upon the work done by courts each year, obtains a
report from each county clerk of the number and kind of cases disposed of
in the county for the year. The investigators for the sub-committee have
found that many county clerks and their deputies simply estimate the number
of cases when they make these reports. By actual count, some of the reports
are in error one hundred cases when they are checked. For example, the
clerk of Marion County in 1932 failed to report the one thousand four hun-
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dred fifty-one cases closed by the Marion Probate Court, and the statistical
report by the Legislative Reference Bureau for the year 1932 must therefore
be in error by that amount. In the same year in Jennings County the county
clerk correctly reported the total number of cases, but incorrectly apportioned
them among civil, criminal and juvenile cases. In Monroe County the deputy
clerk frankly admitted that for the year 1932 she "estimated" the number of
insanity, Riley Hospital and proceedings for the sale of real estate, and added
the amount to the actual number of civil cases tried. In this instance the estimate is most regrettable because the statistics indicate an extremely low cost
for Monroe County, and the clerk's estimate throws doubt on the accuracy
of these figures.
II. The Cost of Courts of General Jurisdiction in Indiana, Including Circuit, Superior, Probate, Criminal and Juvenile Courts.
a. Scope.
The reason for confining the sub-committee's study to the courts above
enumerated was because of the limitation of time and the statistical difficulties above mentioned. The figures available for the circuit, superior, probate,
criminal and juvenile courts were in better shape than the statistics of the
municipal, majors' or justice of the peace courts, and moreover represent the
bulk of the court expenditures in this state for the administration of justice.
b. The Work of the Judges.
The sub-committee made a study of the amount of work done by each
court during the year 1932. In order to obtain comparative figures, the subcommittee took as the basis for comparison the cases disposed of during the
year. The sub-committee realizes that the use of this basis contains some
element of unfairness, but the unfairness is probably greater to judges of
metropolitan areas than in rural districts for the reason that long and complicated receiverships and estates appear more frequently on the dockets of the
courts in the more populous areas and that more preliminary motions are
probably presented there. However, the basis seemed to be the fairest which
could be selected and the unfairness involved should not be serious.
A number of counties are parts of circuits. In respect to these counties,
the sub-committee had to determine upon a method of allocating the salaries
of judges to the various counties in the circuit. The method which seemed
fairest, and was adopted, was to take the total weeks of court terms held in
the circuit as one hundred per cent and divide the expenditures common to
both counties in the ratio of the weeks of court prescribed by statute for
each county.
Among other things which this study of the work done by the courts
revealed was that in the Third Judicial Circuit (Crawford and Harrison
Counties) court is held for only thirty weeks out of each year, or approximately fifty-seven per cent of the time. In several other circuits court is
held for only thirty-two weeks each year. In other circuits court is held for
forty-six weeks, forty weeks and the like. Judges carry heavy responsibilities
and are entitled to vacations commensurate with such responsibilities, but the
sub-committee feels that a four weeks vacation is probably adequate for any
judicial officer, and that courts should be in session for at least forty-eight
weeks per year.
The study further revealed that the total number of cases disposed of per
county (including both civil and criminal cases) ranges from 93 in Brown to
8,352 in Lake and 11,830 in Marion County. Because of the large volume of
business handled in Lake and Marion Counties, the sub-committee felt that
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the inclusion of the statistics from these counties in figuring averages might
result in an inaccurate picture of the work done in other counties, and for
that reason the figures from these counties were eliminated from the figures
used in determining the average cases disposed of. The result of the survey
indicated that the arithmetical average number of cases disposed of by each
judge in the state is approximately 700 cases per year and the modal average
is approximately 800 cases per year. While this might seem to be a tremendous number of cases for the average judge to dispose of in approximately
two hundred fifty working days per year, it must be remembered that approximately thirty-three and one-third per cent of all civil cases are terminated
by dismissal, and approximately forty per cent of all criminal cases are terminated by dismissal. In addition to this, a great number of consent judgments
are entered in civil cases. Moreover, a very substantial number of divorce
cases are non-contested. Figures are not available to determine how many
consent decrees and non-contested divorce decrees are entered each year.
The sub-committee has prepared a list of counties, alphabetically arranged,
showing for each county the number of judges of courts of general jurisdiction, the total number of cases disposed of by each judge, and the average
number of cases per judge per year. An examination of this schedule made
it obvious that the legislature could profitably redefine the judicial circuits in
this state and eliminate a number. For example, a list showing present combinations in counties and also possible combinations of counties in the circuits which your sub-committee believes would be more efficient than at the
present time (each circuit to be handled by only one judge) is as follows:
LIST OF PRESENT JUDICIAL
CIRCUITS CONSISTING OF
ONLY ONE COUNTY

Present
-Circuit
Number
1
2
4
9
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
31

Other
Cases
Di sposed of Judges
P'er Judge In County
County
2
Vanderburgh 891
378
0
Warrick
0
576
Clark
0
Bartholomew 507
323
0
Posey
1
638
Knox
335
0
Clay
0
886
Sullivan
Morgan
0
376
Shelby
632
0
Wayne
0
1,036
Hancock
599
0
1,314
Marion
8
440
Boone
0
283
Warren
0
Montgomery 587
0
Tippecanoe
374
1
Hamilton
644
0
Randolph
434
0
Adams
318
0
Wabash
356
0
Wells
286
0
543
Cass
0

Lake

1,193

6

LIST OF PROPOSED JUDICIAL
CIRCUITS WHICH WOULD
INCLUDE ONLY ONE
COUNTY
Cases
Disposed of
County
Per Judge Judges

Knox
Sullivan
Shelby
Wayne
Hancock
Marion
Tippecanoe
Lake
LaPorte
Elkhart
Allen
Vigo
Delaware

638
886
632
1,036
599
1,314
749
1,193
839
615
1,205
1,114
836

2
1
1
1
1
9
1
7
1
2
3
2
2

Grant
Madison
Henry
Kosciusko
Huntington
St. Joseph
Howard
Greene
Monroe
Gibson

552
1,065
825
706
774
1,123
797
801
1,019
710

2
2
1
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
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LIST OF PRESENT JUDICIAL
CIRCUITS CONSISTING OF
ONLY ONE COUNTY
Presen t
Cases
Other
Disposed of Judges
Circuit
Numbe r
County
Per Judge In County

32

34
36
38
39
41
43
45
46
47
48
50
51
52.
53
54
55
56
58
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
71
72
73
74

75
76
30
30

LaPorte
Elkhart
Tipton
Allen
White
Fulton
Vigo
Clinton
Delaware
Vermillion
Grant
Madison
Miami
Floyd
Henry
Kosciusko
Hendricks
Huntington
Jay
St. Joseph
Fountain
Howard
Greene
Putnam
Rush
Gibson
Porter
Parke
Decatur
Blackford
Marshall
Fayette
Carroll
DeKalb
Benton
*Newton
*Jasper

419
615
275
1,205
354
318
743
398
836
419
552
1,065
476
546
825
706
389
774
544
1,123
422
797
801
412
431
710
569
269
242
178
737
405
323
563
314
223
234

1
1
0
2
0
0
2
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

* Counties separated by Acts, 1933, page
1260; figures of cases disposed of are for
1932.

LIST OF PROPOSED JUDICIAL
CIRCUITS WHICH WOULD
INCLUDE ONLY ONE
.COUNTY
Cases
Disposed of
County
Per Judge Judges

Porter
Marshall
DeKalb

1,138
1,137
563

1
1
1
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LIST OF PRESENT JUDICIAL
CIRCUITS CONTAINING
MORE THAN ONE
COUNTY
Cases
Other
Pr esent
Disposed of Judge, s in
Cirrcuit
Counties
Per Judge Circu it
Nu tuber

3

Crawford and
Harrison
377
5
Jefferson and
Switzerland
308
6
Ripley, Jennings and
606
Scott
7
Ohio and
Dearborn
286
8
Brown and
Johnson
600
10
Monroe and
1,211
Owen
30 *Newton and
457
Jasper
33
Noble and
Whitley
658
35
Lagrange and
Steuben
699
37
Franklin and
Union
568
40
Lawrence and
829
Jackson
42
Orange and
Washington
443
44
Starke and
Pulaski
504
49

Martin and
Daviess

57

Pike and
Dubois

580

572

Perry and
Spencer
362
Total Number of J udges 105
Total Number of Cases 73,437
Average Number of
Cases per Judge
700
* This circuit, in existence in 1932, was
abolished by Acts, 1933, p. 1260.
70

LIST OF PROPOSED JUDICIAL
CIRCUITS CONTAINING
MORE THAN ONE
COUNTY
Cases
Disposed of
Counties
Per Judge Judges

Putnam and
Hendricks
801
Montgomery and
Boone
1,027
Vermillion and
Fountain
841
Tipton and
Hamilton
919
Carroll and Clinton 721
Miami and Wabash 832
Fulton and Cass
861
Benton and Warren 597
Newton, Jasper
and White
Adams, Wells
and Blackford
Jay and Randolph

Noble and Whitley
Lagrange and
Steuben
Lawrence and
Jackson
Starke and Pulaski
Martin and Daviess

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

782
978

658

1
1
1

699

1

829
504
580

1
1
1
1
1

Decatur, Ripley
and Jennings
671
Franklin and Union 568
836

Warrick, Spencer
and Perry
740
Orange, Crawford
and Washington
639
Posey and
Vanderburgh

1

811

Floyd and Harrison 727
Clark and Scott
753
Dearborn, Ohio,
and Switzerland
and Jefferson
593

Fayette and Rush

1

1
1
1
1
1
1

Pike and Dubois
Bartholomew

572

3
1

and Brown

600

1

Morgan and

2,875

1
Johnson
883
Clay, Owen
1
and Park
796
81
Total Number of Judges
Total Number of Cases 73,437
Average Number of Cases
per Judge
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It may seem on a casual reading that the proposal to expect the disposition
of an average of 900 cases per year a judge is expecting too much. A
number of factors, however, indicate that this expectation will not impose
an unreasonable hardship upon the judges. These factors are as follows:
(First) In counting the number of cases disposed of, all cases disposed
of by dismissal, by consent decree and by change of venue are included as
disposed of, and these should approximate forty to fifty per cent of the cases.
(Second) The judges of practically all courts included in these statistics
take approximately two months vacation each year, and court terms are from
thirty to forty-four or forty-six weeks during the year. If, on the present
schedule of time spent, the judges have heretofore handled an average of
700 to 800 cases per year, they should be able, in a forty-eight week court
year, to handle the number of cases proposed in the sub-committee's proposed
regrouping of courts.
(Third) The sub-committee is hereinafter recommending that advance
deposits to cover costs be required at the filling of any civil case, and that
deposits to cover the cost of a jury be required in cases where a jury trial is
demanded. These recommendations should result in a large number of
unfounded cases never being filed and thereby never occupying the time of
the judge, and should further result in a substantial decrease in the number
of jury trials demanded, thereby enabling the judge to handle his calendar
much more efficiently.
(Fourth) The sub-committee will hereafter recommend that the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court shall have the power, when he finds it necessary or convenient, to assign the judge of any circuit to hold court in any
other circuit in the state where the circuit may be congested or where there
may be any need for assistance for the judge. This should enable the judges
whose calendars are crowded to obtain assistance at an expense to the state
of only the traveling expense of the assisting judge, and so handle any burden
of litigation which turns out to be too great for the regular judge to handle.
(Fifth) In many courts the present court day averages five hours in
length, viz., from 10:00 to 12:00 a. m. and from 2:00 to 5:00 p. m. The
sub-committee suggests that all judges hold court from 9:30 a. m. to 12:30
p. m., and from 2:00 p. m. to 5:00 p. m., thus adding an additional hour to
each court day. While this does not seem large, in the aggregate it would
mean an increase of twenty per cent in the time which could be used in hearing cases, and should assist materially in handling the volume of litigation
which the sub-committee's investigation leads it to believe feasible for one
judge to handle.
To summarize, the committee, in respect to the judges of the state, recommends a reorganization of the judicial circuits, changing the present seventysix circuits with one hundred six judges to fifty-five circuits with a total of
eighty-one judges, and the abolition of the LaPorte Superior Court, the Porter Superior Court and one Superior Court of Vigo County.
c.

Court Reporters.

Court reporters take down testimony at a trial and transcribe the same for
the bill of exceptions in the event of an appeal. Reporters are appointed by
the judge (3 Burns R. S. 1933, Sec. 4-351; Baldwin's Ind. Stat. 1934, Sec
1288) and their salaries are fixed by the judge and county commissioners
(3 Burns R. S. 1933, Sec. 4-3507; Baldwin's Ind. Stat. 1934, Sec. 1298-1).
In addition, the reporter is paid by the party desiring to take an appeal, at
the rate of ten cents per one hundred words (3 Burns R. S. 1933, Sec. 4-3506;
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Baldwin's Ind. Stat. 1934, Sec. 1298) for preparing a bill of exceptions containing the testimony and rulings of a trial. Of course, only a small percentage of cases are appealed, but payments for the preparation of transcripts
constitute a substantial addition to the reporters' other incomes.
The sub-committee finds that, in counties where the cost per case is high,
relatively high salaries are paid to court reporters, and, conversely, in counties where the cost per case is low, the reporters are paid much less. The
following table shows the differences of the salaries in three high cost and
three low cost counties:
County
Blackford LaPorte
Reporter's salary --------- $1,000
$5,400
No. cases disposed of-----178
839
Average cost per case ---- $5.61
$6.42

Adams
$1,634
318
$5.14

Monroe Sullivan
$985
$1,659
1,019
886
$0.96
$1.87

Whitley
$570
390
$1.46

The sub-committee believes that there should be one reporter appointed for
each judge, who should go on circuit with the judge, and further believes
that in view of the skill required a maximum salary of $1,800 is reasonable
compensation for the reporter where the judge is disposing of 800 or more
cases per year. Of course this salary would be augmented by compensation
for preparing bills of exceptions.
d. Bailiffs.
In connection with the costs of courts the sub-committee believes that there
is no court in the state which needs both a bailiff and a "riding bailiff,"
although the statute (Burns R. S. 1926, Sec. 1845; Baldwin's Ind. Stat.
1934, Sec. 1256) empowers each judge of the circuit, superior, probate, criminal and juvenile courts to appoint both a bailiff and a riding bailiff. Only
about half of the judges have appointed two bailiffs. The riding bailiff is a
survivor of the pioneer days and is no longer needed.
The bailiffs are paid on a per diem basis fixed by the board of commissioners of each county. The statutes regarding the compensation of bailiffs are
in considerable confusion. By Acts 1899, page 173 (2 Burns R. S. 1926,
Sec. 7858; Baldwin's Ind. Stat. 1934, Sec. 7552) provision is made for a
$2.00 per diem for the bailiff. By Acts 1919, page 523, Baldwin's Ind. Stat.
1934, Sec. 7551) provision is made for a salary of not to exceed $100 per
month for bailiffs in counties which have criminal or superior courts. Bailiffs
contrive to work each court day, so their allowances amount for all practical
purposes to salaries. Where the county costs are high, the sub-committee
finds that high salaries or per diem allowances are paid to bailiffs, and conversely where county costs are low the allowances are low. The following
schedule shows the contrasts in costs between three high cost counties and
three low cost counties:
County
Blackford LaPorte Adams
$742
Cost of bailiffs ----------- $2,025
$7,400
No. of cases disposed of....
178
839
318
Cost of bailiffs per case....
$12.00
$8.80 - $2.33

Monroe Sullivan
$422
$498
1,019
886
$0.41
$0.56

Whitley
$477
390
$1.22

Attention is further called to the fact that in 1932, in La Porte County the
bailiff of the superior court received a salary of $2,600 per year, and in the
LaPorte Circuit Court two bailiffs were employed at salaries aggregating
$4,800 per year. The sub-committee is of the opinion that the duties of a
bailiff do not call for skill and ability of a high order, and that considering the
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relatively nominal qualifications necessary for the bailiff's work, the salary
limit and per diem charge provided by the statute is entirely reasonable. The
sub-committee specifically recommends that the three statfites above cited be
repealed, and that a new statute relating to bailiffs of all courts be enacted,
eliminating the possibility of having two bailiffs for one judge, and clarifying
the salaries which may be paid.
e.

Costs-Courts of General Jurisdiction.

There is at present an elaborate schedule of fees which must be paid by
litigants to county clerks for various services in connection with litigated
matters. (Acts 1927, Ch. 138, p. 406, et seq.; Baldwin's Ind. Statutes, 1934,
Sec. 7561; Burns Supp. 1929, Sec. 7876.) A similar schedule of fees for
the various services of the Sheriff in connection with litigation is also prescribed. (Acts 1919, p. 605; Baldwin's Ind. Statutes, 1934, Sec. 7570;
Burns R. S. 1926, Sec. 7882.) Both parties are liable for the payment of
these fees. (Acts 1927, p. 406; Baldwin's Ind. Statutes, 1934, Sec. 7564;
Burns R. S. 1933, Sec. -.
)
In case a non-resident plaintiff desires to bring a suit, the clerk, or, on
motion of defendant, the court may order the plaintiff to file an undertaking,
with sufficient sureties, to pay costs. (Baldwin's Ind. Statutes, 1934, Sec.
402; 3 Burns R. S. 1933, See. 2-4708.) Justices of the peace may require
security for costs from plaintiffs living out of the county. (3 Burns R. S.
1933, Sec. 5-311; Baldwin's Ind. Statutes, 1934, Sec. 1876.) In some instances (e. g., the prosecutor's fee in a divorce case, Baldwin's Ind. Statutes,
1934, Sec. 918; Burns R. S. 1933, Sec. 3-1214) the clerk may require the
deposit of a fee in full in advance, but these instances are few. Moreover,
even where the statute provides for such deposit in advance, the method of
administration is subject to much variation. Thus, in Blackford County, in a
divorce action no deposit is required. In Marion County, on the filing of a
divorce action, a deposit of $3.00 is required. In Monroe County, on filing
a divorce action, a deposit of $5.00 is required. In Orange County, at the
time of filing a divorce action, a deposit of $15.00 is required, and in St.
Joseph County the courts require that all fees in divorce cases be paid before
the judge issues a final decree. So far as can be ascertained, the above statute is the only warrant in law for any of the above practices.
On appeals to the Supreme or Appellate Courts, the appellant must give
an appeal bond which covers the judgment below, and costs, including costs
of appeal. (Baldwin's Ind. Statutes, 1934, Sec. 480; 3 Burns R. S. 1933,
Sec. 2-3204.) And in the United States District Courts, the plaintiff in a
civil action must, at the time of filing, not only give an undertaking to pay all
costs incurred in the action, but must also deposit the sum of $25.00 in
advance with the clerk against costs to be incurred, and as soon as costs
incurred exhaust the deposit of $25.00, another deposit of a like amount
must be made before the court will proceed further with the case. (Rules of
the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Indiana,
Rule 6(a), 6(c) and 6(g).)
The sub-committee caused an investigation to be made of the percentage
of costs collected during the year 1932 in ten counties in the State. The
figures obtained by the sub-committee, in spite of the greatest of care in
compilation, are subject to some question, because of the difference in the
time of assessing costs in different county clerks' offices. Some county clerks
tax costs as they are incurred; others tax them on rendition of a judgment in
the cause; and still others do not tax costs until one of the litigants makes
inquiry as to the amount of costs or offers to pay them. It is, therefore,
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obvious that statistics for the costs assessed in any one year in any county
may be quite misleading, and form no real basis for comparison. The error,
if any, is such thaf the statistics err on the side of showing fewer costs assessed
than actually should have been.
In the time allowed, it was impossible to check the costs assessed and collected in all counties of the State of Indiana. The sub-committee, therefore,
made a check on ten counties which were considered fairly representative, viz.,
White, Porter, St. Joseph, DeKalb, Blackford, Hancock, Jennings, Orange,
Monroe and Vigo. The following table shows the amount of costs assessed
during the year 1932 in each county, the amount of such costs collected during the year 1932, and the amount collected during the year 1933, and the
costs collected in the first six months of 1934, together with an average showing the assessments and collections during the respective periods for the ten
counties. In considering the effect of this schedule, it must be remembered
that the cases studied were cases which were filed in 1932 and closed before
June 30, 1934, so that at least one year and a half may have expired since the
closing of the cases, in which time the parties may voluntarily, or under
coercion, have paid the costs taxed therein. The schedule is as follows:
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From the foregoing table, the sub-committee believes that it can fairly be
said that of the costs assessed in civil litigation which should go into the
treasuries of the counties and reduce the amount necessary to be raised by
taxation, the counties, a year and a half after cases are closed, have failed to
collect, on an average, 46% of the total costs assessed, amounting to roughly
$23,000 per year for the ten counties.
In the Supreme and Appellate Courts, where the appeal bond covers costs,
the figures indicate a similar percentage of collections, as shown by the
following table:
Costs assessed
in 1932 in cases
docketed and
disposed of

Appellate $5,337.00
(182 cases)
Supreme
1,469.00
(73 cases)

Paid
1932
$356

Paid
1933

Paid
1st 6 mo.
1934

Total

$995

$400

$1,751

67

$3,586

44

359

87

490

65

979

Percent
Unpaid Balance

In contrast with the foregoing is the record of the District Court of the
United States for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division,
for the year 1932. Fees assessed in civil cases pending on the law side of
the court totaled $2,391.50. Of these fees, $176.50 were not collectible because the United States was the plaintiff, and $74.20 was not collectible because the plaintiffs sued in forana pauperis. (U. S. Code 28:832-836.) The
entire balance of the fees assessed on the law side, amounting to $2,140.80,"
was collected. In other words, on the law side of the court in civil cases,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, collected every fee assessed, except in the two classes in which
it knew that fees could not be collected. On the equity side of the court
the facts are even simpler. The total fees assessed in 1932 on cases closed
in 1932 was $1,872.41, and the total fees collected was $1,872.41, or 100%
collection. It seems clear that the system of requiring a deposit in advance
to apply against costs, as and when they are assessed, operates even more
efficiently than the system of requiring the giving of a cost bond.
The relative share of the burden of the expense of litigation borne by the
taxpayer, and the relative share borne by the litigant are shown by the following table:

County

Average
total expense per
case (1)

St. Joseph
$24.43
Hancock
25.73
Blackford
76.72
27.50
White
28.74
DeKalb
Orange
18.15
Monroe
12.84
Porter
35.33
Jennings
37.31
Vigo
30.61
Average for
10 counties 31.73

Average
costs assessed per
case (2)

$9.82
7.11
8.52
11.51
9.60
8.10
9.11

9.20
6.42
8.30
8.76

Percentage
of costs
Average
assessed,
costs col- Percentage Percentage
lected after of expense of expense
collected
borne by
after 18
18 months borne by
litigants
in dollars taxpayer
months
17.8%
$4.36
82.2%
44.42%
17%
61.79%
4.39
83%
6.2%
5 5.79%
4.75
93.8%
21.9%
52.54%
6.04
78.1%
82.1%
17.9%
51.75%
4.96
21%
3.97
49.13%
79%
47.46%
335%
4.32
66.5%
17%
65.88%
6.06
83%

3.20
2.88

91.5%

34.74%

90.6%

8.5%
9.4%

51.34%

4.49

82.98%

17.02%

49.91%

1 Total-no segregation of civil and criminal, excludes sheriff's office expense and
sheriff's salary.
2

Civil cases only-includes sheriff's costs.
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Again it seems clear from the table listed above, which the sub-committee
considered fairly representative of the condition throughout the State of
Indiana, that as between taxpayers and litigants the taxpayers are bearing
entirely too large a proportion of the expense of civil litigation.
Three theories may be presented with regard to who should bear the
expense of civil litigation. In the first place, it might be said, even as to
civil litigation, that it was the duty of the state to furnish a tribunal for the
settlement of disputes between citizens and that whether the state received
any income from the litigants was immaterial. In the second place, it might
be said that in civil litigation the matter is one in which the parties are
primarily concerned, and the state has only a secondary interest, and that
therefore the parties should bear the entire cost of litigation. This theory
runs into the almost insuperable difficulty that it is impossible to determine
what any one litigated action costs. The third theory is a modification of the
two foregoing theories. It is simply that the administration of justice is a
state function to be furnished at state expense, but that when individuals
make use of the court, the state may properly regard this use by individuals
as a reasonable source of revenue not related to the cost of administration of
justice but simply for the purpose of bringing money into the state treasury
in a reasonable amount. Mr. Kenneth Dayton, in an article, "Costs, Fees and
Expenses of Litigation," published in The Annals of the American Academy
of Political Science, in Vol. 167, at page 45, says that he thinks that the last
theory is the only one which can be maintained in practice. With this view
the sub-committee is in accord. The sub-committee therefore believes that the
Legislature should reconsider the amount of costs taxed in civil litigation and
believes that those amounts could be substantially increased to the end that
the litigant should bear at least fifty per cent or more of the actual cost of
his case. Particularly is this true of cases where one or the other party
demands a jury trial which results in an extremely high cost to the county.
The revision of the costs to be charged against litigants would be a futile
gesture unless such costs were actually collected. The figures obtained by
the committee indicate that a very large percentage of costs in civil litigation
remain uncollected, even after a case has been closed as long as eighteen
months. For this reason the sub-committee believes that the legislature
should require a deposit to be made by each person filing a civil case in a
circuit, superior or probate court of at least $15.00; should require the clerks
to assess against litigants costs as incurred; should require the clerks, when
the deposit for costs has been consumed, by costs incurred, to notify the
judge of the court of that fact; should require the judge, upon such notice,
to take no further action until a further deposit to cover additional costs
shall have been made; and should make it the duty of the clerk to advise-the
court of the making of such further deposits, so that litigation may proceed.
Only by increasing the amount of court costs assessed against litigants, and
by requiring deposits in advance to cover such costs can the taxpayers be
relieved of the unreasonably large burden which they are now carrying for
litigants.
At the present time, the Indiana statutes require a docket fee of Four
Dollars to be taxed to the losing party when a case goes through the Supreme
Court, and a docket fee of Ten Dollars to be taxed to the losing party when
a case goes through the Appellate Court; and the statute further provides
that no docket fee shall be assessed if the appellant in either court dismisses
his appeal before submission. (Baldwin's Ind. Stat. 1934, Secs. 1327, 1367,
1336-3.) As shown heretofore, supra, page 124, a large amount of costs are
uncollected in those courts. The sub-committee recommends the repeal of
the above statutes and the enactment of a new statute providing in substance
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that upon the filing of an appeal in either the Supreme or the Appellate
Courts, and on the filing of a petition to transfer in the Supreme Court, the
Clerk of the court shall demand and receive, before the case is filed, a docket
fee of Twenty-five Dollars, which shall become the property of the state in
all events, but which shall be taxed to the losing party as a part of the costs
to be recovered by the successful party.
The sub-committee of course realizes that it would be unwise to make a
requirement of deposit for costs which would bar or discourage the filing
of cases by poor persons having a genuine cause of action. Indiana today
has a statute (2 Burns R. S. 1933, Sec. 2-211; Baldwin's Ind. Stat. 1934,
Sec. 26) which purports to give courts the means of allowing poor persons to
prosecute or defend cases, with the aid of counsel appointed by the court.
The statute is quite indefinite in relation to costs and has been construed not
to require the Clerk of the court to render any services for a poor person
without compensation. (Kerr v. State, 35 Ind. 288.) This statute should be
revised to be at least as definite as the provisions relating to suits by poor
persons in the Federal courts (U. S. Code, Title 28, Sec. 832-835). In order
to prevent abuse of the right to sue as a poor person, the statute should
require an affidavit specifically setting forth, among other relevant facts, the
nature and items of all property of the maker of the affidavit, should include
the names of the bank or banks with which the maker of the affidavit has done
business within the two years next preceding the filing of said affidavit, and
should require a statement that the affiant had not transferred or conveyed
any property, except for an adequate consideration, during the years last past,
and should fix the limit of value of the property which a person might hold
and still be entitled to sue as a poor person. The sub-committee recommends
that this limit be placed at $300.00.
With adequate provisions insuring that the advance deposit of costs will
not work a hardship on poor persons, the sub-committee believes that such a
provision will be extremely helpful in transferring a greater portion of the
burden of the cost of litigation from the taxpayer to the litigants.
f.

Recommendations Regarding Costs in Municipal and City Courts.

The sub-committee's .studies of the costs assessed and collected in the
municipal courts indicates that a condition prevails in those courts which is
in all respects similar to that prevailing in the Circuit, Superior and Probate
Courts with respect to costs. For example, in the Municipal Court of
Marion County during the calendar year 1932, the sub-committee's investigation reveals the following situation:
No. of
Civil
Cases
7,837

Total
Fees
Assessed
$64,917

2,238

$9,017

Average
Total
Costs
Paid
Paid
Paid
Fees
Balance
% Assessed
1932
1933
1934
Paid % Paid Unpaid Unpaid Per Case
$4,255 $3,279 $1,760 $9,294
14.3 $55,623
85.7
8.28
(Dismissed cases only included in above figures)
$2,657 $1,092
$251 $4,000 44.3
$5,017 55.7
4.02

The sub-committee's investigations further indicate that the taxable costs
provided for under the present statutes should be sufficient, if the costs were
collected, to maintain the City and Municipal Courts on a self-supporting
basis, and even, in some instances, yield a slight revenue. The sub-committee
is of the opinion, however, that the only way that adequate provision can be
made for the collection of these costs is to rdquire a deposit of Five Dollars
on account of costs at the time of filing each civil case in a municipal or
city court.
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The practice is very widespread in both the Marion Municipal Courts
and in the city courts throughout the state of suspending the costs where
persons are convicted of minor criminal offenses. Such a practice, in the
opinion of the sub-committee, imposes too much of a burden upon the taxpayer. The sub-committee, therefore, believes that the municipal and city
courts now existing should be deprived by statute of the power to suspend
the enforcement of a judgment for costs in criminal cases.
With the two modifications suggested above, it is certain that the burden
of the expense of the municipal and city courts of the State of Indiana will
be taken from the taxpayers and carried entirely by the litigants.
g. ProvisionsEnabling Judges of Circuits with Crowded Dockets to
Secure Assistance from Judges of Other Circuits.
Article 7, Section 10, of the Indiana Constitution provides as follows:
"The General Assembly may provide, by law, that the Judge of one Circuit may hold the courts of another Circuit, in cases of necessity or convenience; and in case of temporary inability of any Judge, from sickness or .other
cause, to hold the Courts in his Circuit, provision may be made, by law, for
holding such courts."
Indiana has elaborate provisions for permitting the appointment of special
judges in certain cases, and also in permitting the appointments of judges pro
tempore. (2 Burns R. S. 1933, Sec. 2-1402, 2-1409, 2-1411, 2-1412, 2-1416,
-. ) The cost of special
4-402, 4-403; Baldwin's Ind. Stat. 1934, Sec.
judges throughout the State during the year 1932 was $36,180.00. The appointment of special judges is sometimes caused by parties filing applications for change of venue from the judge, sometimes by the necessity of a
judge having assistance in clearing up a crowded docket. In its studies the
sub-committee has been made to realize how difficult it is to apportion the
judicial circuits so that all judges will bear approximately the same burden of
litigation. In order to enable judges of circuits which may have a large number of cases to receive assistance from judges of circuits where the burden of
litigation is not so great, the sub-committee believes that a statute should be
enacted by the Legislature empowering the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, upon a showing of necessity or convenience, to authorize the judge
of one circuit to hold court in another circuit in specific cases, or for specific
periods of time to assist in clearing up crowded dockets, and the like. A
statute of this type would fall within the provision of the Constitution above
quoted, and would, in the opinion of the sub-committee, insure a large saving
of special judges' pay during each year.
h. Jury Trials and Their Expense to the Taxpayer.
Trial by jury is a distinctive element of Anglo-American judicial procedure. It arose because of the need of some agency to mitigate the harshness of the King's justice in early England, and has served for several centuries to temper the strict letter of the law (especially the criminal law) with
the community's idea of right and wrong, of justice and fairness. It took
centuries of time, much suffering, and many deaths, to give us the jury
system, which is one of the keystones of Anglo-American individual liberty.
A short era during which the jury system seems to function rather inefficiently should hardly be sufficient reason for attempting to discard the system
which had been won at such cost.
In civil litigation, juries function very well in certain tort actions where
liability depends upon the question whether the defendant "did or omitted
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to do an act which an ordinarily prudent man would not have done or
omitted in similar circumstances." Juries frequently function well in the
assessment of damages. But in civil litigation, they are subject to many
drawbacks.
In the first place, they are expensive. Juries in courts of general jurisdiction in Indiana are composed of twelve householders, each of whom is paid
$2.50 per day for his services and five cents per mile for each mile necessarily
travelled in attending court. (2 Burns R. S. 1933, Sec. 4-3319; Baldwin's
Ind. Stat. 1934, Sec. -. ) This means that the average jury's service costs
the county between $35.00 and $50.00 per day, depending upon the mileage
paid to jurors. Against this sum, the statutes permit the taxation to the
litigant of a jury fee of $3.00. (2 Burns R. S. 1933, Sec. 4-3319; Baldwin's
and no more, regardless of how many days are
Ind. Stat. 1934, Sec. -)
consumed in the trial. Considering the time spent in Indiana state courts in
selecting the jury, the time for presentation of evidence and arguments, the
time involved in the judge's instructions to the jury, and finally, the time
involved in the jury's deliberations, it is seldom that a jury case which is
really contested is finished in two days. Many of them consume a number
of days of the court's time, and so cost the taxpayers more money.
An unfortunate element in many jury trials is the emphasis placed upon
the dramatic, for the purpose of influencing, not the intelligence, but the emotions, of the jury. Some attorneys spend much time in building up evidence
to a climax, and lay stress upon irrelevant matters calculated only to influence
the emotions and obscure the real issues. This stage-managing of a jury
trial takes time-and costs the taxpayers more. Moreover, by taking so much
of the court's time, it delays all other pending cases, to the injury of other
litigants. For the foregoing reasons, the sub-committee -feels that jury trials
in civil cases should be discouraged, except when the litigant demanding the
jury trial is willing to bear the major part of the cost of the jury.
To that end, the sub-committee recommends the enactment of a statute
providing that, in civil cases, the litigant's right to a jury trial is waived
unless a request in writing for a jury trial is filed by the plaintiff within
fifteen days after the cause is at issue upon the facts or by the defendant
within twenty days after the cause is at issue upon the facts; that the party
filing such request must deposit therewith the sum of $30.00; and that in case
the jury trial shall last more than one day, the court shall assess, as a part of
the costs, the additional sum of Ten Dollars per day, to be collected from the
losing party and placed in the County funds as partial compensation for the
cost of the jury.
Such a statute should result in three benefits to taxpayers. First, it would
transfer a substantial part of the cost of the jury to the litigants; second, it
would reduce the number of jury trials requested; third, it would shorten
jury trials by placing a powerful incentive upon parties to expedite trials by
avoiding unnecessary arguments over technicalities in the admission of evidence, unnecessary quibbling in the selection of jurors, prolonged arguments
over the legal propriety of instructions tendered, and the like. Such shortening of trials would, in turn, reduce the unit cost to the taxpayer of court
officials other than jurors, etc.
D.

RECOMMENDATIONS IN

THE INTERESTS OF LITIGANTS IN

CIVIL CASES.

PreliminaryStatement.
From current legal literature, from the press, and from personal observation, the sub-committee believes that criticism of the administration of civil
justice in Indiana falls under three heads, (a) delay, (b) cost, and (c) unI.
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certainty. The sub-committee has certain suggestions as to changes in procedure which it is hoped will make a start toward lessening such criticisms.
We say "lessening," for so long as justice is administered through human
institutions, these criticisms will never be entirely eliminated.
The sub-committee here takes occasion to point out that a number of the
recommendations made in the interest of the taxpayers operate also in -the
interest of bona fide litigants. Especially, the recommendations as to increasing the assessable costs of litigation, requiring a deposit to cover the same,
and requiring a deposit on.account of the jurors' fees in advance by parties
demanding a jury trial, should operate in the interest of bona fide litigants
by preventing the filing of "nuisance" litigation, i. e., litigation without foundation, but costing time and trouble to defend, and worry while it is undisposed of; and by lessening the demands for long jury trials of especially
uncertain outcome. By making the jurors' fees and other increased costs
collectible as part of the judgment in favor of the successful party, the party
litigant who is in the right need have no fear of additional cost.
II.

Elimination of Delays.

a. Delays of Personnel.
Though legal procedure is responsible for some delays in the administration of civil justice, the primary source of delay will probably be found in
the counsel for the litigants and the trial judge. Very frequently in serious
litigation where no public interest is involved, both parties are uncertain of
the outcome. Such cases should be compromised, but compromise is often
impossible because of either the character of the case, or the then financial
condition of one or the other of the parties. In such cases, counsel on both
sides are apt to resort to obstructive tactics to delay the case being placed at
issue for trial, and then both counsel frequently unite in asking the court for
a postponement of the trial.
The trial judge is placed in a very difficult position when asked by both
parties for a continuance. No hard and fast rule can be applied. If there
is real ground for a continuance, the court should, of course, grant it. But
where no sound reason for the delay exists, the judge should point out that a
continuance simply adds to the accumulation of litigation before the court;
that unnecessary delays by a litigant are of concern not only to him and his
adversary, but to other litigants having business in that court, to taxpayers,
and to the State itself; and should refuse the continuance. No amount of
legislation can cure this cause of delay-it must be done by the judges and
the lawyers.
b. Delays Due to Procedure.
1. Changes of Venue in Civil Cases. Our statutes now provide for a
change of venue from the judge in cases not triable by jury (2 Burns R. S.
1933, Sec. 2-1402; Baldwin's Ind. Statutes, 1934, Sec. 193) and also for
changes of venue from the county in all cases. (2 Burns R. S. 1933, Sec.
2-1401; Baldwin's Ind. Statutes, 1934, Sec. 190.) It is therefore possible for
a litigant to ask first for a change of venue from the judge and then for a
change of venue from the county.
Where a case is of the type in which a jury trial cannot be demanded, and
the case must be heard and determined by a judge, it would seem that any
possibility of unfairness to a litigant is removed by permitting a change of
venue to be taken from the judge. For this reason, the sub-committee
believes that the statute should be modified to deny a right of change of venue
from the county in cases which are not triable by jury.
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In order that no bias or prejudice of the trial judge from whom the
change was taken may enter into the selection of the new judge who will hear
the case, the sub-committee recommends that instead of the present practice
of permitting the judge from whom the change of venue is taken to name
three judges or lawyers, (Burns R. S. 1933, Sec. 2-1409; Baldwin's Ind.
Statutes, 1934, Sec. 207) the statute be amended to provide that upon the
filing of an affidavit for change of venue from the judge, the trial judge shall
certify the motion to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall
designate a judge either of another circuit or superior court within the state
to hear the case, or, in event all such judges are prevented by other business
from acting, shall name three practicing attorneys in the county in which the
case is pending who are not interested in the case, and counsel in the case
shall strike to determine the judge, as under the present statute.
With respect to cases which are triable by jury, there is no doubt that the
right of change of venue from the county should be preserved in cases where
there is a genuine need for it. The Indiana statutes do not prescribe at what
stage of a civil case a change of venue from a county may be filed, but the
practice generally is that such motions are not filed until the issues have been
made up. The sub-committee believes that a great many changes of venue
are taken solely for the purpose of further delay and without a genuine feeling on the part of the party requesting the change that such change is really
necessary to insure him receiving justice, and that many of the evils involved
may be prevented by-a statute providing that no motion for change of venue
may be filed until such time as the issues have been closed on an issue of
fact and a request for a jury trial shall have been filed; and that, in case a
motion for change of venue is filed by either party after the other has requested a jury trial, the motion must be accompanied by a bond in the penal
sum of Three Hundred Dollars with surety to be approved by the court, conditioned on the payment of all costs involved in the change of venue and all
other costs in the case, in event the litigant seeking the change of venue is
unsuccessful, and by a deposit in a sufficient amount to cover the cost of the
transcript on the change of venue.
Such a statute would result in the following situation: a plaintiff desiring
to secure a change of venue would be required to file a request for a jury
trial and accompany it with a deposit of Thirty Dollars before he could file
a motion for a change of venue. A plaintiff would not be required to give
a bond because he is required to keep on deposit with the clerk at all times
a sum sufficient to cover costs. A defendant desiring to file a motion for
change of. venue would be required, in the event the plaintiff had not previously asked for a jury trial, to file a request for a jury trial, accompanied
by a deposit of Thirty Dollars, and also to pay the cost of the transcript
on change of venue and give a bond for the payment of any further costs
which might ultimately be assessed against him. In event the plaintiff had
previously asked for a jury trial, the defendant desiring the change of venue
would simply be asked to pay the cost of the transcript on the change of
venue and also give the bond. In any event, however, the realization that
bond is given to cover costs of the trial would deter litigants from piling up
additional costs through a change of venue, unless it was felt that there was
a genuine reason for such change.
If the objection is advanced that the imposition of these terms makes a
change of venue a luxury which only the rich litigant can afford, the subcommittee's answer is that, for the poor litigant who has a genuine cause of
action or defence, and who should have the benefit of the change of venue
laws, the affidavit for leave to litigate as a poor person would afford ample
protection.
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c.

Sutmmary Judgments.

Even though there be no defense to an action which is filed, a defendant,
by insisting that the plaintiff folloNr exactly the legal procedure laid down by
the Indiana civil code before obtaining a judgment can frequently cause a
delay of months, and in some cases, years, before the plaintiff can obtain a
judgment. The injustice of this is particularly glaring where the cause of
action sued on is an open account or is a promissory note, or a contract of
sale which has been fully performed by the seller, and similar classes of
actions where there can be no real dispute as to the amount to which the
plaintiff is entitled. The sub-committee is impressed with the procedure
recommended by the Commission on the Administration of Justice in the State
of New York. Though in New York it is in the form of a rule of civil
practice, we believe that in this state the provision for summary judgment
should be enacted in the shape of a statute which would be a part of the
Indiana Code of Civil Procedure. The procedure which the sub-committee
recommends is apparent from the phrasing of the New York rule which, the
sub-committee believes, should be enacted as part of the statute. It is as
follows:
"In any action, the complaint or any cause of action therein, may be dismissed or the answer may be struck out and judgment entered in favor of
either party on motion upon the affidavit of a party or of any other person
having knowledge of the facts, setting forth such evidentiary facts as shall, if
the motion is made on behalf of the plaintiff, establish his cause of action
sufficiently to entitle plaintiff to judgment, and if the motion is made on behalf
of the defendant, such evidentiary facts, including copies of all documents,
as shall fully disclose defendant's contentions and show that his denials or
defenses are sufficient to defeat plaintiff, together with the belief of the
moving party either that there is no defense to the action or that the action
has no merit, as the case may be, unless the other party, by affidavit or other
proof, shall show such facts as may be deemed by the judge hearing the motion
sufficient to entitle him to a trial of the issues. If upon such motion made on
behalf of either party it shall appear that the other party is entitled to judgment, the judge hearing the motion may award judgment accordingly, even
though no cross-motion therefor has been made.
If the plaintiff or defendant in any action shall fail to show such facts as
may be deemed, by the judge hearing the motion, to present any triable issue
of fact other than the question of the amount of damages for which judgment
should be granted, an assessment to determine such amount shall forthwith
be ordered for immediate hearing to be tried by a referee, by the court alone,
or by the court and a jury, whichever shall be appropriate. Upon the rendering of the assessment, judgment in the action shall be rendered forthwith.
If it appears upon a motion for summary judgment that the triable issues
of fact are confined to a single issue or to issues of a limited character, and
that the other issues raised by the pleadings do not present any triable issues
of fact the court may direct the trial forthwith of the specified issue or issues
by a referee or by the court, or by the court and a jury, whichever shall be
appropriate, and upon the coming in of the decision or verdict, the court shall
grant final judgment in the action or make such other disposition of the case
as may be proper.
This rule shall be applicable to counterclaims, so that either party may
move with respect to the same as though the counterclaim were an independent action. The court in its discretion may provide for the withholding of
entry of judgment until the disposition of the issue in the main case.
This rule shall be applicable to all pending actions."
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The sub-committee will hereafter recommend the adoption of certain bills
recommended by the Indiana State Bar Association allowing the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules of procedure in civil cases. In event the Legislature adopts the bill prepared by the State Bar Association and also desires
to adopt the recommended provision for summary judgment, the sub-committee suggests that the statute, as finally drafted, provide that the conditions
upon which summary judgment may issue may be changed from time to time
by the Supreme Court, as found desirable.
III.

Abolition of Terms.

The sub-committee believes that the present system of prescribing certain
terms at which court is to be held and other periods during which the court
is in vacation produces an unnecessary confusion and complexity in procedural matters. The only useful substantive function afforded by terms of
court is to provide a period within which a judgment remains in the entire
control of the trial court. The sub-committee is of the opinion that if terms
were abolished and courts were nominally in session all year, the judge of the
court could select the period during the summer at which time he desired to
take his vacation without regard to statutory terms, and the court would be
in session up until the time when the judge actually left his jurisdiction.
Moreover, with the flexible provisions for transferring other circuit judges
which have been heretofore recommended, if the business in any circuit warranted such action, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court would appoint the
judge of an adjoining circuit to hold court during the period when the regular
judge of the circuit was taking his vacation, thus enabling litigants at all times
to have a forum in which to present their cases.
The sub-committee believes that the statute abolishing terms should provide for some period, probably sixty days, during which a judgment rendered
by a trial court should remain within the complete control of the court so'that
it could be amended or corrected, as the court desired, and that thereafter the
judgment should be final and beyond the control of the trial judge. This
suggested period of sixty days should commence to run with the date of the
rendition of the judgment, or, if a motion for new trial was filed, within sixty
days after the date on which the motion for new trial was overruled.
This provision might necessitate some change in the provisions of the
statute relating to term-time appeals, but the substance of such appeals might
be preserved by providing that appeals which should have the effect of staying execution must be prayed and allowed and the appeal bond filed and surety
approved during the said period of sixty days after the overruling of the
motion for new trial.
IV.

Collection of Money Judgments.

At the present time money judgments are enforced by levies of execution
made by the county sheriff or his deputies, followed by sale of the judgment
Baldwin's Ind. Statutes,
debtor's property (Burns' R. S., 1933, Sec. -;
1934, Secs. 521-680, inclusive). It is a well-known fact that deputy sheriffs,
when levying executions carry with them printed schedules, advise judgment
debtors of the nature of the exemption laws, assist judgment debtors in filing
schedules, and so not only make no real effort to collect the judgment, but
actively assist the judgment debtor in avoiding the effect of the same. While
this may be due to sympathy or consideration of political nature, it is certain
that such procedure results in a disrespect on the part of the average layman
for judgments rendered by a court and a feeling that money judgments
against the average individual are really of little consequence. Moreover, it
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is assisting in a deterioration of the morals of the community and the current
feeling today that debtors should not have to pay their debts is in some respects traceable to the difficulties in the way of collecting money judgments.
An investigation of the money judgments rendered in Marion County
during the year 1932 in the Circuit, Superior and Probate Courts reveals that
of 2934 judgments for a total of $9,600,330, only 1547 judgments for a total
of $1,267,098 have been collected up to Sept. 26, 1934. In other words,
the percentage of judgments in which total or partial collections are made
is 18.3%, and the percentage in money of the amount collected is 13.2%.
To enable money judgments to be made more efficacious in this state, the
sub-committee believes that the following changes in the procedure should
be adopted:
First. It should be made possible for a plaintiff to attach the property
of resident defendants in certain types of actions where the cause of action
is one where the plaintiff is simply attempting to collect for goods sold, money
loaned, and the like without an affidavit that the defendant is about to,
abscond, as the statutes now require (2 Burns' R. S., 1933, Sec. 3-501;
Baldwin's Ind. Stat., 1934, Sec. 772). Examples of the types of actions in
which attachment should be permitted against resident defendants are as
follows:
1. To recover a debt or liquidated demand arising on a contract, express
or implied, in fact or in law, sealed or not sealed; or
2. To recover a debt or liquidated demand arising on a judgment for a
stated sum; or
3. On a statute where the sum sought to be recovered is a sum of money
other than a penalty; o'r
4. To recover an unliquidated debt or demand for a sum of money only
arising on a contract express or implied, in fact or in law, sealed or not
sealed, other than for breach of promise to marry; or
5. To recover on a claim for the hire of a chattel or chattels or for damages for the taking or detention thereof; or
6. For an accounting arising on a written contract, sealed or not sealed.
Of course, in these actions the safeguards given in the present statutes
(Burns' R. S. 1933, Sec. 3-508; Baldwin's Ind. Stat., Sec. 776) requiring
the filing of bond by the plaintiff would be required. In many cases, however,
the requirement of the bond operates as an unnecessary hardship on a plaintiff. For these reasons, the sub-committee recommends that the court should
have the power, by ex parte order, to dispense with the plaintiff's bond in any
action to recover,
A. For goods sold and delivered where proof of delivery is annexed to
the complaint.
B. For work, labor and services performed, where proof of the performance of the services is annexed to the complaint.
C. A sum of money due on a written instrument, where a copy of the
instrument is incorporated in or annexed to the complaint.
D. A sum of money due on a judgment, where a copy of the judgment
is incorporated in or annexed to the complaint.
After the attachment has been made, the court upon defendant's application showing a meritorious defense or counterclaim to the action, may require
a plaintiff's bond where such bond had theretofore been dispensed with, or a
bond in a larger amount than that fixed by the statute where one had already
been furnished.
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Second. Frequently during the conduct of a law suit, a defendant proceeds to dispose of his property, in order to render himself "judgment proof."
It is true that a plaintiff recovering judgment against a defendant who had
done this may bring proceedings supplementary, or may levy on the transferred property in the hands of third persons, but these remedies are generally
ineffective and frequently expensive and uncertain in relation to the amount
of money involved. In order to stop this practice, the courts should be given
by statute the power to enjoin a defendant from transferring his property
during the pendency of the action, upon satisfactory proof by plaintiff that
he has a prima facie cause of action, and that tht defendant is about to
transfer or dispose of his property to defeat a judgment which may be
rendered in the action. Moreover, whenever a money judgment is obtained,
it should automatically contain an injunction restraining the judgment debtor
from transferring any of his property until the satisfaction of the judgment,
or, on further order of the court in the case.
In this connection, the sub-committee of course believes that the proposed
statute should make satisfactory provision for relieving a debtor's exempt
property (Acts 1933, Ch. 222, p. 1014) from the attachment.
Third. The sub-committee further believes that the statutes relating to
proceedings supplementary (2 Burns' R. S. 1933, Secs. 2-4401 to 2-4408,
incl.; Baldwin's Ind. Stat, Secs. 671 to 678, ind.) should be modified by
allowing semi-annual examinations of the judgment debtor until the judgment
is paid or expires by operation of law. No requirement that the judgment
creditor show that the defendant has any property should be attached to these
examinations. Such examinations should be a matter of right, on motion of
the judgment creditor in the cause in which the judgment was rendered,
rather than by a separate civil action, as under the present statute. Pounds v.
Chatham, 96 Ind. 342. Likewise, our present statute (2 Burns' R. S. 1933,
Secs. 2-4403 to 2-4406; Baldwin's Ind. Stat., Secs. 883 to 886) allowing the
examination of third parties who may hold property of the judgment debtor
or be indebted to the judgment debtor should be modified to be a part of the
proceedings in which judgment was rendered, rather than an independent
proceeding; and instead of requiring an unequivocal affidavit that the third
party has property of the judgment debtor or is indebted to the judgment
debtor, it should be sufficient if the affidavit show reasonable cause for belief
that the third party has such property or owes such indebtedness.
Fourth. The sub-committee will hereafter recommend that the lawenforcing functions of the county sheriffs be transferred to the state or
municipal police departments. This will leave the sheriff as the county official
who executes the decrees and judgments of the county court. The sub-committee recommends that the sheriff's salary be fixed at a minimum, and that
he be allowed certain reasonable fees, based upon the sum which he collects
on account of judgments rendered. Under such a system the sheriff and his
deputies would have an incentive to enforce the collection of judgments,
rather than to discourage such collections.
V. The Bar Association Bills Concerning a Judicial Council and the Reform
of Procedure by Ride.
The Indiana State Bar Association at its annual convention in July, 1934,
acting through its committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, recommended the passage of (1) a bill creating a judicial council; and (2) a bill
vesting in the State Supreme Court the power to alter our present statutes
relating to procedure by rule. 10 Ind. Law Journal, 12. The full text of
these bills may be found in 8 Ind. Law Journal, pages 52-54. The sub-
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committee is further informed that some effort to revise and possibly to combine these bills will be made prior to the legislative session of 1935, but that
the substance of both bills will be preserved.
The bill recommending the change and improvement of court procedure
by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court is, in the opinion of the subcommittee, sound and in line With the policy adopted by the last Congress of
the United States in authorizing the Supreme Court of the United States to
govern procedure on the law side of the Federal Court by rules to be promulgated by the United States Supreme Court (U. S. C. 18, Sec. 723b). The
Supreme Court has heretofore exercised the power to control procedure on
the equity side of the Federal Court as a part of the inherent power with
which it is vested-that is, the powers vested in the English Court of Chancery in 1789. Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U. S.
33, 54 L. Ed. 80.
While the text of the bill does not seem to grant such power to the
Supreme Court, the sub-committee believes that it should be made clear in
any act granting power to control procedure by rule of the State Supreme
Court that such .power should not include the power of regulating costs or
impairing the security which the Legislature demands for the payment of
costs. The sub-committee's reason for this is that costs are not essentially a
part of the judicial procedure, but, as heretofore pointed out, (supra, page
24) are a source of revenue of the government arising out of its services in
furnishing a forum for the settlement of disputes between its citizens and
between its citizens and the sovereign. The sub-committee therefore believes
that the power to fix the minimum amount of costs to be paid and also to
assure that the necessary steps are taken to collect the costs which are assessed, should, for the protection of the taxpayer, remain in the legislative
branch of the Government.
In so far as the bill authorizes the change of court procedure in criminal
cases by rule, the sub-committee finds itself in an interesting situation. The
sub-committee has heretofore procured the services of Professor James J.
Robinson of the Law School of Indiana University to make an exhaustive
study of the code of criminal procedure approved by the American Law
Institute. Professor Robinson is reviewing this model code with a view of
finding in what respects it differs from criminal procedure now in force in
the State of Indiana, and with a view of modifying the model code in any
aspects which he finds necessary to make the code fit into the general background of Indiana law. The model code represents the best thought and
study of some of the ablest experts on criminal law and its administration in
the United States. If the rule making power were at once vested in the
Supreme Court, doubtless the Supreme Court would make a long and careful
study of this model code before promulgating its own rules governing criminal
procedure. Inasmuch as the Bar Association's bill provides that any statute
or rule of court relating to procedure which shall be in force at the time the
act becomes effective shall remain in full force until the Supreme Court shall,
by rule or rules adopted under the statute, prescribe a procedure in consistence
with or in lieu thereof, the sub-committee feels that Professor Robinson's
work in the examination of the American Law Institute's model code of
criminal procedure should be adopted by the Legislature and serve as a base
upon which the Supreme Court can build in promulgating rules modifying
the criminal procedure prescribed therein. The sub-committee's views on this
point will be stated more fully in connection with the reports on criminal
procedure.
With the principle behind the Bar Association's bill for the creation of a
judicial council the sub-committee is heartily in accord, and the following
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suggestions are made, not because of lack of sympathy for the bill, but because of a belief that the functions of the judicial council might be even
broader than those outlined in the present Bar Association bill. In the first
place, the sub-committee is heretofore adverted to the difficulties of obtaining
any satisfactory statistics relating to the administration of justice in Indiana
(supra, pages 6 to 9, incl.). It is entirely possible that Section 5, subsection
1, of the Bar Association's bill (8 Ind. Law Journal, 53) providing that it
shall be the duty of the council, "To continuously study and survey the operation of the judicial department of the State, and the volume and condition of
business in the courls" would require the compilation of adequate statistics.
On the other hand, the New York bill establishing a judicial council, which
was just adopted by the Legislature of New York, (see 28 Journal of American Judicature Society, 18, June, 1934) after stating the first duty of the
judicial council in very similar language to that used in the Bar Association's
bill, adds a section reading as follows: "(b) To collect, compile, analyze and
publish the judicial statistics of the State, in compliance with Article 6, Section 22, of the Constitution." The sub-committee believes that the publishing of statistics, which is not required by the judicial council bill, and the
compilation of statistics, which is only inferentially required'by the Bar Association bill, are matters of vital importance. Publication of the statistics
regarding the work of judges would furnish the public with accurate knowledge of just what work the courts were doing, and would enable both the
Legislature and the public to understand the difficulties under which the
courts labor, and to criticize more intelligently courts which were not up to
the general standard of Indiana courts. The compilation and publication of
proper, adequate judicial statistics would require the advisory board to have
certain trained assistants and a sufficient amount of funds to carry on their
study effectively and publish the results of their work.
The sub-committee will hereafter recommend that in so far as is possible
under our present Constitution, judges be selected by appointment, and that,
if possible by Constitutional change, all judges be selected by appointment,
instead of by election. In event any of such recommendations are adopted,
the sub-committee believes that the judicial council could serve a further very
useful function in advising the Governor with regard to the personal qualifications of candidates for judicial office or for the office of prosecuting
attorney, in case of the death of an incumbent. In short, the sub-committee
feels that a capable judicial council would furnish an advisory body in which
the public could have entire confidence, to reflect an informed and disinterested
professional opinion on proposed changes in personnel, in organization and
in procedure, and it would be entirely possible for such a council to make
recommendations as to rules or procedure to the Supreme Court, on court
organization and other matters to the Legislature, and on personnel and other
relevant mattdrs to the Governor.
In conclusion, the sub-committee recommends to the general Committee
that the general Committee approve in principle the two bills above referred
to proposed by the Indiana State Bar Association, and recommend the consideration of the minor variations in such bills which the sub-committee has
discussed herein.
E.

RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE INTEREST OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC.

Method of Selecting Judges.
There has been much agitation surrounding the method of selection of
judges. That the influence of politics in the selection of judges has produced
a profound deterioration in the administration of state courts can hardly be
I.
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doubted. Stuart H. Perry, "Politics and Judicial Administration," 28 Journal
of the American Judicature Society, 133; Feb., 1934; id. Annals American
Academy of Political and Social Science, Sept., 1933. The non-partisan election of judges would be possible under our present constitutional provisions,
but, as Mr. Perry points out, this is really an ineffective makeshift. Those
who have had experience with an independent judiciary appointed during
good behavior-a judiciary found in this country in the Federal courts, and
the courts of such states as Massachusetts and New Jersey--can advocate no
bther plan of selection of judges.
The appointment of judges by the Governor of course places in the executive department a tremendous power. However, since the judges are appointed during good behavior, and since the executives change every four
years, each Governor would have an opportunity to appoint only a few
judges.
Certain safeguards, however, might be added if the sub-committee's
recommendation for a judicial council were accepted-thus the judicial council might prepare a list of practicing lawyers whom it feels qualified by
character, education and experience to fulfill the judicial office with credit
and efficiency, and the Governor's appointment in each judicial circuit made
from the practicing attorneys of such circuit who were on such list prepared
by the judicial council.
While Article 7 of the Constitution of Indiana vests the judicial power
of the state in the Supreme Court, in Circuit Courts, and in such other
courts as the General Assembly may establish, and provides that the judges
of such courts shall be elected for six-year terms, there is no constitutional
requirement that judges of legislative courts should be elected. In fact, in
Indiana's most recently created court, viz., the Municipal Court of Marion
County, the judges are appointed by the Governor on a bi-partisan basis for
four-year terms. The sub-committee is of the opinion that it would be
highly desirable for the judges of all legislative courts, viz., the Appellate
Court of Indiana, the various Superior Courts of Indiana, and the Municipal
and City Courts, to be appointed by the Governor on a bi-partisan basis
where there is more than one judge of a court, and that they be appointed
during good behavior, instead of a specific term of four or six years. The
assurance of a permanent judicial career, instead of a temporary one, dependent upon the whim of the voters, would attract much more capable men to
the bench. The security of tenure (and in this connection the sub-committee
believes that a provision similar to that contained in the Federal Constitution
should be enacted-that the pay of judges shall not be reduced during their
term in office) would make the judges beyond the suspicion of political motives in rendering their decisions. The necessity for an independent judiciary,
independent-First, in that they hold office during good behavior; and Second, that their pay may not be diminished during their tenure of office, has
been powerfully stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S.245, 251, 64 L. Ed. 887, 891, in which that
court says:
"More recently the need for this independence was illustrated by Mr.
Wilson, now the President, in the following admirable statement:
"'It is also necessary that there should be a judiciary endowed with substantial and independent powers, and secure against all corrupting or perverting influences; secure, also, against the arbitrary authority of the administrative heads of the government.
"'Indeed, there is a sense in which it may be said that the whole efficacy
and reality of constitutional government resides in its courts. Our definition
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of liberty is that it is the best practical adjustment between the powers of
the government and the privileges of the individual.
"'Our courts are the balance wheel of our whole constitutional system;
and ours is the only constitutional system so balanced and controlled. Other
constitutional systems lack complete poise and certainty of operation because
they lack the support and interpretation of authoritative, undisputable courts
of law. It is clear beyond all need of exposition that for the definite maintenance of constitutional understandings it is indispensable, alike for the preservation of the liberty of the individual and for the preservation of the integrity
of the.powers of the government, that there should be some non-political
forum in which those understandings can be impartially debated and determined. That forum our courts supply. There the individual may assert
his rights; there the government must accept definition of its authority. There
the individual may challenge the legality of governmental action and have it
adjudged by the test of fundamental principles, and that test the government
must abide; there the government can check the too aggressive self-assertion
of the individual and establish its power upon lines which all can comprehend
and heed. The constitutional powers of the courts constitute the ultimate
safeguard alike of individual privilege and of governmental prerogative. It
is in this sense that our judiciary is the balance wheel of our entire system;
it is meant to maintain that nice adjustment between individual rights and
governmental powers which consi itutes political liberty.' "
The suggestion that the Legislature provide that judges of Appellate,
Superior and Municipal Courts be selected by appointment, and that their
tenure of office be during good behavior is, in the opinion of the sub-committee, now possible by legislative action. The same considerations, however,
which make it desirable to have such judges appointed during good behavior
make it equally desirable that the judges of the Circuit and Supreme Courts
be so selected. That, however, is a matter involving constitutional amendment, and is one of the long-time objectives which the sub-committee recommends the Committee to point out as a means of improving the administration
of justice in Indiana.
Small Claims Court.
It is the opinion of the sub-committee that the present administration of
justice is defective in that it makes no adequate provision for the litigation of
small claims upon a basis differing from the usual means of litigation. Under
present law and practice a claimant is compelled to seek the services of an
attorney for the presentation of a claim however small and to prosecute the
claim in one of the existing courts where the procedure differs but slightly
from the procedure used in cases involving large sums of money. Usually
these claims are filed in the municipal and justice of the peace courts. In the
municipal courts the claim can only be presented properly by an attorney and
there may be considerable delay in the decision of the case. The court costs
and the expense of employing an attorney are out of all proportions to the
amount of the claim involved. In the justice of the peace courts the costs
usually exceed the costs in the municipal or circuit courts and the case is tried
before a judge who usually has no qualification for his office. The justice
of the peace court likewise tries a considerable number of small criminal
cases and acts as a committing magistrate in felony cases-that is, he may
inquire into the probable guilt of a defendant to determine whether or not
he shall be proceeded against in one of the superior courts. In view of the
fact that the prosecuting attorney has ati unlimited discretion in this latter
situation there seems to be no occasion for this procedure and if there is it
can be taken care of by the municipal courts.
II.
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The sub-committee is therefore of the opinion that the justice of peace
court should be abolished because it serves no useful purpose in modern
society. A number of years ago there was some necessity for a small court
in the outlying communities of a county. This necessity no longer exists in
view of the ready accessibility of municipal and county courts. The Indiana
Constitution provides that "A competent number of justices of the peace shall
be elected, by the voters in each township in the several counties. They shall
continue in office four years, and their powers and duties shall be prescribed
by law." Judicial jurisdiction of the justice of the peace is entirely statutory
and it is the opinion of the sub-committee that the justice of the peace may
be deprived of all judicial power. What judicial authority there is in this
state upon the subject sustains this opinion. The justice of the peace in
England was simply a conservator of the peace and not a judicial officer.
The repeal of the statutes giving judicial jurisdiction to the justice of the
peace would still leave the justice of the peace with a number of duties to
perform and would not interfere with any constitutional provision.
As a substitute for the present system of taking care of small claims litigation the sub-committee recommends that statutes be enacted providing for
a small claims division in those municipal courts where the judge is elected
or appointed strictly as a judicial officer, and in the event that there is no
such municipal court in a county that a provision be made for a small claims
division in the circuit and superior courts. For the same reason that the
justice of the peace should be deprived of his judicial jurisdiction the municipal court presided over by the mayor should also be deprived of his jurisdiction at least as to civil litigation. In fact few mayors' courts attempt to
exercise any civil jurisdiction at the present time. A person having a small
claim should be provided with a procedure for the enforcement of his claim
which will be both efficient and inexpensive. The state owes a duty to this
class of persons to make available to it the judicial system to all practical purposes without expense. The person with a rather substantial claim can ordinarily finance his own litigation and has no difficulty in securing the service
of an attorney upon a contingent basis. It is felt that the municipal courts,
most of which are not occupied full time, could easily take care of this additional litigation. In those communities where a municipal court is not available it is felt that the circuit court should be required to find the time to take
care of this subject matter.
Recently in the State of New York a small claims court has been established. A copy of the Statute and the Rules of Court under which this court
operates are attached hereto and made a part of this report. With few modifications the New York Statute could be copied in this state. It is the opinion
of the sub-committee that the limit there fixed, that is, $50.00 is a proper
limit. It is recommended that the Indiana Statute specifically provide that
the parties shall not be represented by attorneys except with the approval
of the presiding judge who shall have the power to fix the fees to be paid to
attorneys and to tax as costs such attorneys fees or reasonable part of them,
in those cases where the presiding judge is convinced that the trial was not
in good faith. The Indiana Statutes should also provide that the judge may
hear the trial of a small claim in any part of the county, and in the evening
if desirable.
a.

Rules for New York City Small Claims Court Procedure.
Rule I.

The plaintiff, or someone in his behalf, shall state the nature and the
amount of his claim to the clerk, who, after due inquiry, shall cause the claim
to be reduced in writing in the form provided, in concise untechnical form,
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and to be signed by the plaintiff or someone in his behalf. The statement, as
entered in the docket by the clerk, shall contain a general statement of the
cause of action, giving the time, place and other relevant circumstances.
Rule II.
The plaintiff, or someone in his behalf, shall also state to the clerk, the
plaintiff's place of residence and, insofar as he knows, the defendant's place
of residence, usual place of business or place of employment, or such thereof
as the clerk may deem necessary, including the street and number, if any; and
the clerk shall note the same in the form provided.
Rule III.
The clerk shall give to the person signing the claim a memorandum of
the time and place set for the hearing, which time shall not be less than five,
nor more than eleven days from the commencement of the action. Subpoenas
for witnesses, if requested, shall be issued by the clerk without fee.
Rule IV.
The clerk shall mail to the defendant on the same day that the claim is
received at one or more of the addresses supplied by the plaintiff, as the clerk
may deem necessary or proper, by registered mail, return receipt requested,
a notice signed by the clerk, bearing theseal of the court, which, after setting
forth the name of the court, shall read substantially as follows:
"TO (here insert the name of defendant)
" (here insert name of plaintiff) asks judgment in this court against you
for (here insert the amount claimed in dollars and cents) upon the following
claim: (here insert the nature of the claim as it appears on the form).
"The court will give a hearing upon this claim at (here insert the location
of the courthouse and the room therein as may be necessary) at (here insert
the hour) o'clock in the (here insert 'forenoon' or 'afternoon') on (here
insert the date, as may be prescribed by general or special order of the court).
"You or someone in your behalf, must appear at the hearing. Unless you
do, judgment may be entered against you by default. If your defense is
supported by witnesses, account .books, receipts or other documents, you
should produce them at the hearing. The clerk, if requested, will issue subpoenas for witnesses without fees.
"If you admit the claim, but desire time to pay, you must appear on the
day set for the hearing, personally or by someone in your behalf, state to the
court that you desire time to pay and show your reasons for desiring time to
pay."
Rule V.
The clerk shall note on the form the mailing date and address, the date of
delivery shown by the return receipt and the name of the addressee or agent
signing the receipt. Notice shall be valid although refused by the defendant
and, therefore, not delivered. If the notice is returned undelivered, without
refusal by the defendant, or if in any other way it appears that notice has
not reached the defendant, the clerk shall issue, at the expense of the plaintiff,
such other or further notice as the court may order, and note same on the
docket.
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Rule VI.
A defendant, unless the court shall otherwise order, shall be defaulted
unless he shall, personally, or by someone in his behalf, appear at the hearing
on the date fixed. No'judgment shall be entered in any case before the time
set for the hearing.
Rule VII.
If at the hearing it shall appear that the defendant has a counterclaim, or
set-off to the plaintiff's claim, the judge shall either hear the entire case or
must, if the plaintiff so requests, adjourn the hearing for a period not more
than ten days, at which adjourned time the hearing of the entire case is to
be had.
Rule VIII.
Witnesses shall be sworn. The court shall conduct the hearing in such
order and form, and with such methods of proof, as it deems best sited to
discover the facts and to determine the justice of the case, but the court shall
begin the hearing by first eliciting from the defendant or from the one appearing in his behalf, the nature of the defense, counterclaim or set-off. If the
plaintiff, or someone in his behalf, does not appear at the time set for hearing,
the court may dismiss the claim for want of prosecution, or enter a finding on
the merits for the defendant, or make such other disposition as may be proper.
Rule IX.
If the claim is one wherein a body execution may be had, the clerk shall,
in the summons sent to the defendant, state substantially the following words:
"If judgment is procured against you, you will be liable to civil arrest and
imprisonment."
Rule X.
The summons sent to the defendant must contain this statement: "If
you desire a jury trial you must, before the day upon which you have been
notified to appear, file with the clerk of this court a demand for a trial by
jury. At that time you will have to make an affidavit specifying the issues
of fact which you desire to have tried by a jury and stating that such a trial
is desired and demanded in good faith. To obtain a jury trial you will have
to pay a jury fee of six dollars, and you will have to file an undertaking in
the sum of $50 or deposit the sum of $50 in cash to secure the payment of
any costs which may be awarded against you. Under the law the court may
award $25 additional costs to the plaintiff if a jury trial is demanded."
Rule XI.
The undertaking to be filed by a defendant desiring a jury trial shall be in
the form prescribed by Rules 26 and 27 of the Rules of Civil Practice.
Rule XII.
Where the defendant makes proper application for a jury trial, the plaintiff shall be notified by the clerk of such fact.
Rule XIII.
The court may order that the judgment shall be paid to the prevailing
party or, if it so orders, into court for the use of the prevailing party, at a
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certain date, or by specified installments, and may stay the issue of execution
and other supplementary process during the compliance with such order.
Such stay shall at all times be subject to being modified or vacated.
Rule XIV.
If judgment is procured by default and defendant is subject to body execution, a second registered letter shall be sent to the defendant by the clerk,
informing him of the judgment outstanding against him and of the fact that
he is liable to a civil arrest. No body execution is to issue until three days
after the mailing of such notice.
Rule XV.
The court may at any time upon motion, or after such notice, by mail or
otherwise, as it may order, vacate any judgment entered under this procedure
for want of actual notice to a party, for error, or for any other cause that
the court may deem sufficient, and may stay for a day certain the execution,
and the court may set the case for trial.
Rule XVI.
Where a jury trial is demanded, all papers on file shall be transferred to
the jury part.
Rule XVII.
The word "clerk" -in these rules shall include a deputy or an assistant
clerk.
Rule XVIII.
Notice to an attorney for a party, or to one authorized to appear in his
behalf, shall be equivalent to notice to such party.
Rule XIX.
Uniformity in the application of these rules shall prevail throughout the
city.
b.

Laws of New York-By Authority.
Chapter 598.

AN ACT to amend the New York city municipal court code, in relation to
providing for a prompt and inexpensive determination of claims involving
fifty dollars or less.
Became a law May 15, 1934, with the approval of the Governor. Passed, on
message of necessity, three-fifths being present.
The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Section 1. Title eleven and sections one hundred seventy-nine to one hundred eighty-six, both inclusive, of chapter two hundred seventy-nine of the
laws of nineteen hundred fifteen, entitled "An act in relation to the municipal
court of the city of New York, and repealing certain statutes affecting such
court, its justices and officers," are hereby renumbered title twelve and sections one hundred eighty-nine to one hundred ninety-six, both inclusive,
respectively, and such chapter is hereby amended by inserting therein a new
title, to be title eleven, to read as follows:
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Small Claims.
Section 179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Small claims defined.
Parts for the determination of small claims established.
Commencement of action upon small claims.
When rules and practice of supreme court applicable.
Power to transfer small claims; remedies applicable.
Trial by jury; how obtained; discretionary costs.
Review.
Judgment obtained to be res adjudicata in certain cases.
Procedure unavailable to corporations, associations and
assignees.

Sec. 179. Small claims defined. The term "small claim" or "small
claims" as used in this act shall mean and include any claim or cause of action
or counterclaim within the jurisdiction of this court except summary proceedings for the recovery of real property, where the amount claimed by the
plaintiff or claimant or defendant, or the value of the property affected or
of the right claimed does not exceed fifty dollars, exclusive of interest and
costs.
Sec. 180. Parts for the determination of small claims established. The
president justice shall assign the times and places for holding, and the justices who shall hold one or more parts of the court in each borough for the
hearing of small claims as herein defined, and it shall be the duty of the
board of justices by majority vote, which rieed not be taken in convention
assembled, before the effective date of this title and such board by majority
vote which need not be taken in convention assembled, shall have power,
from time to time, to make, alter and amend rules regulating the practice and
procedure controlling the determination of such claims and to prescribe and
furnish the forms for instituting the same. Such practice, procedure and
forms shall differ from the practice, procedure and forms used in the court
for other than small claims, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary. They shall constitute a simple, informal and inexpensive procedure for
.the prompt determination of such claims in accordance with the rules and
principles of substantive law. The procedure established pursuant to this
title shall not be exclusive of but shall be alternative to the procedure now
or hereafter established with respect to actions commenced in the court by
the service of a summons. No rule to be enacted pursuant to this title shall
dispense with or interfere with the taking of stenographic minutes of any
hearing of any small claim hereunder.
Sec. 181. Commen cement of action upon small claims. Small claims
shall be commenced upon the payment by the claimant of a filing fee of one
dollar and twenty-five cents, without the service of a summons and, except
by special order of the court, without the service of any pleading other than
a statement of his cause of action by the claimant or someone in his behalf to
the clerk or an assistant deputy clerk who shall reduce the same to a concise,
written form and record it in a docket kept especially for such purposes. Such
procedure shall provide for the sending of notice of such claim by mail to
the person complained against and for an early hearing upon and determination of such claim. The cost of sending such notice shall be included in the
filing fee hereinbefore specified.
Sec. 182. When rides and practice of supreme court applicable. The
court shall conduct hearings upon small claims in such manner as to do sub-
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stantial justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law
and shall not be bound by statutory provisions or rules of practice, procedure,
pleading or evidence, except statutory provisions relating to privileged communications and except the provisions of section three hundred and fortyseven of the civil practice act. The provisions of the civil practice act, the
rules of civil practice, the provisions of this code and the rules of this court
shall apply to claims brought under this title so far as the same can be
made applicable and are not in conflict with the provisions of this title; in
case of conflict, the provisions of this title shall control.
Sec. 183. Power to transfer small claims; remedies applicable. The
court shall have power to transfer any small claim or claims to any other part
of the court upon such terms as the rules may provide, and proceed to hear
the same according to the usual practice and procedure applicable to other
parts of the court. The provisions of section one hundred and thirty-nine of
this chapter shall be applicable in the enforcement of judgments obtained
under this title.
Sec. 184. Trial by jury; how obtained; discretionary costs. A person
commencing an action upon a small- claim under this title shall be deemed to
have waived a trial by jury, but if said action shall be removed to a regular
part of the court, the plaintiff shall have the same right to claim a trial by
jury as if such action had originally been begun in such part. Any party to
such action, other than the plaintiff, prior to the day upon which he is notified
to appear or answer, may file in the court where the action is pending a
demand for a trial by jury and his affidavit that there are issues of fact in
the action requiring such a trial, specifying the same and stating that such
trial is desired and intended in good faith. Such demand and affidavit shall
be accompanied with the jury fee required by law and an undertaking in the
sum of fifty dollars in such form as may be approved by the rules payable
to the other party or parties, conditioned upon the payment of any costs
which may be entered against him in the said action or any appeal within
thirty days after the entry thereof; or, in lieu of said undertaking, the sum
of fifty dollars may be deposited with the clerk of the court and thereupon
the clerk shall forthwith transmit such original papers or duly attested copies
thereof as may be provided by the rules to the part of the court to which the
action shall have been transferred and assigned and such part may require
pleadings in such action as though it had been begun by the service of a
summons and such action may be considered a preferred cause of action. In
any small claim which may have been transferred to another part of the
court, and the court may award costs up to twenty-five dollars to the plaintiff
if he prevails.
Sec. 185. Review. A person commencing an action upon a small claim
under this title shall be deemed to have waived all right to appeal, except that
either party may appeal on the sole grounds that substantial justice has not
been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law.
Sec. 186. Judgment obtained to be res adjudicata in certain cases. A
judgment obtained under this title may be pleaded as res adjudicata only as
to the amount involved in the particular action and shall not otherwise be
deemed an adjudication of any fact at issue or found therein in any other
action or court.
Sec. 187. Procedure unavailable to corporations, associations and assignees. No corporation, partnership, or association and no assignee of any
small claim shall institute an action or proceeding under this title.
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III. The Supreme and Appellate Courts.
The present Constitution provides for a Supreme Court of five judges.
This Court has been unable to take care of the appellate business of the state,
and for the past forty years or more we have had an Appellate Court consisting of six judges created by the Legislature. In order to preserve the
constitutional power of the Supreme Court to finally determine the law of
the State it has been necessary to provide by statute for the review of the
Appellate Court decisions by the Supreme Court. The Appellate Court is
thus an intermediate court, and a great many of its decisions must be reviewed
by the Supreme Court. It seems to be the'judgment of those most interested
in the problem that there is involved in this system an unnecessary duplication of work and delay in the disposition of appeals. It seems clear that one
court of nine judges could do the work which is now performed by the two
courts consisting of eleven judges. In order to effect such a change a constitutional amendment would be necessary. It is, therefore, recommended
that the Constitution in this respect be amended to provide that the Supreme
Court shall consist of not less than five judges nor more than eleven.
A previous recommendation provides for a constitutional amendment making all judges appointive so that the amendment here proposed should include
both propositions.
IV.

The Sentencing of Criminals.

The Committee on Public Welfare will submit a recommendation for a
reorganization of the administration of the parole of criminals. Under the
present system, the parole board has too little leeway in dealing with prisoners
and must often release a prisoner who, in the opinion of the board, should
not be released, and is likewise compelled to refuse to release a prisoner who
ought to be paroled. This arises from the fact that under the present law
terms are fixed for most crimes, and the jury and judge are given the power
to determine within limits what sentence the defendant shall serve. There
is a total lack of uniformity in the sentencing of criminals, with consequent
injustice to the defendant or society. The persons most interested in the
problem are convinced that the average judge and jury are very poorly
equipped to deal with this problem and that it should be dealt with by a
competent parole board. Reference is made to the report of the sub-committee on Public Welfare for the statistics and additional statements on this
subject. To effectuate the recommendations there made it will be necessary
to amend the present statutes.
It is therefore recommended that a statute be enacted (1) depriving the
jury in all criminal cases of determining the length of service of a sentence
or the amount of fine. In misdemeanor cases the latter should be determined
by the judge. This would eliminate a great many unnecessary jury trials
where under the present practice a jury trial is demanded on the hope that
the jury may deal with the defendant with some leniency. In felony cases
where capital punishment may be imposed the judge should fix the penalty.
In all of these cases the jury does its full duty if it determines the innocence
or guilt of the defendant. The further question of the amount of punishment
to be inflicted is one upon which it has little knowledge or ability. In capital
cases the above suggestion would eliminate a great deal of delay in the selection of the jury, for it would no longer be pertinent to inquire whether or not
a juror believed in capital punishment. It would likewise eliminate a number
of jury trials, where the defendants hope that a jury will be more lenient than
the judge;
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(2) reducing the minimum penalty in felony cases (except those punishable by death) to one year, and providing that on conviction in felony cases
(except those punishable by death) the defendant shall be sentenced for a
term of one year to the maximum now provided by law for the crime involved.
The real length of the service would thus be finally determined by the parole
authorities under the procedure outlined in the report on Public Welfare.
The result should be a better approximation of justice to the defendant and
society, and effect would be given to the constitutional mandate that "The
penal code shall be founded on the principles of reformation and not of vindictive justice."
Amendments as to Criminal Procedure.
The Committee has previously recommended the passage of an act proposed by the Indiana State Bar Association conceding to the Supreme Court
the power to make rules of procedure for all of the courts of the State. In
the field of criminal procedure, however, there are a number of obvious weaknesses which require immediate attention and where a present statutory modification of the existing rules would, in all probability, be accepted by the
Supreme Court when it attacks the problem. At the present time, there is
considerable unnecessary delay in the trial of criminal cases and some miscarriage of justice due to rather obvious defects in the law of criminal procedure. To remedy the more obvious defects the committee recommends the
adoption of the following proposals:
Proposal 1. Joint defendants in felonies, as in misdemeanors, shall be
jointly tried, or shall have separate trials in the discretion of the court.
Modern crimes are commonly committed by partnerships or gangs. But
when brought to trial in Indiana each joint defendant or member of the gang
may demand a separate trial, and an old statute compels the court to allow
as many separate trials as there are defendants making such a request, if the
crime charged is a felony. The court has no discretion to refuse the demand,
although if a misdemeanor is involved the judge may require proof that there
is a good reason requiring separate trials. The defendant commonly has no
excuse whatever for loading the burden of separate trials on the tax payers,
witnesses and jurors. Frequently the demand is made because he expects to
gain from the resulting congestion of the court docket, from the wearing out
or the death of witnesses, and from the possibility of a friendly juror or of
a bargain plea with an overburdened prosecutor and judge.
The present statute reads: "When the indictment or affidavit is for a
felony charged against two or more defendants jointly, any defendant requiring it, before the jury is sworn, must be tried separately." Sec. 9-1804
Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933. The records of the felony courts of Indiana show
repeated instances of the wasteful and unjust operation of this statute.
The proposal for the amendment of the law is:
When two or more defendants are jointly charged with felony, they shall
be tried jointly, unless the court in its discretion on the motion of the prosecuting attorney or any defendant orders separate trials.
This proposal is the law in the United States courts, and in Massachusetts,
New York, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio (except capital cases), Wisconsin, California, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Louisiana, and in England
and Canada, as well as many other American states.
The proposal has the endorsement of the American Law Institute, the
National Crime Commission, and the Indiana Committee on Observance and
The proposal is endorsed also by many
Enforcement of Law (1931).
Indiana lawyers and judges.
V.
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The present Indiana statute changed the common law rule. The proposal
would restore control of the matter to the trial judge. Bishop says, "The
common law rule being, for the ordinary case, that the trying together of
joint defendants promotes convenience and justice; if in an individual instance the contrary appears, the trials should be separate."
The objections which are raised to this proposal center in the fear that
the trial judge will exercise his discretion arbitrarily against the defendant.
This objection applies to every other discretionary power given to the judge
or to any other officer. On a balance of authority and of convenience, the
proposal would seem to be preferable to the present situation.
Proposal 2.

A defendant planning to offer a defense of alibi shall give

notice of such defense to the prosecution before trial, as in insanity cases.
The present situation in regard to the defense on alibi may be stated
briefly. There is no Indiana statute on the subject. The defense is very commonly used, especially in trials of charges of felonies of violence. If the defendant is able to present evidence indicating that he was not at the scene of
the alleged crime at the time when, according to the state's evidence, the crime
occurred, the defendant is not likely to be convicted. Of course if the
defendant is innocent, and was not present at the time and place of the crime,
it seems unfortunate that the prosecution was not informed of such evidence
before the trial. Upon receiving such information the prosecution could have
moved the dismissal of the indictment or affidavit, and could have saved both
the defendant and the state the trouble and the expense of conducting the
trial. If on the other hand the defendant in fact was guilty, the success in
presenting a defense of alibi was due probably to the fact that the state was
surprised by the presentation of such evidence, and that the state was thereby
prevented from investigating the soundness of the alibi defense. In other
words, the element of surprise counts as strongly for the defendant as it did
in the insanity defense before the enactment of the Indiana statute which
requires the defendant to give advance notice before trial that he will present
the defense of insanity.
The proposal for the amendment of the present law is:
Whenever a defendant in a criminal cause shall propose to offer in his
defense evidence to establish an alibi on his behalf, such defendant shall,
within three days following his arraignment in the trial court, file and serve
upon the prosecuting attorney, a notice in writing of his intention to offer
such evidence of alibi. Such notice shall include specific information in
regard to the place at which the defendant claims to have been at the time
of the alleged offense. In event of the failure of the defendant to file the
written notice here prescribed, the court may in its discretion exclude evidence
offered by the defendant to establish an alibi.
The jurisdictions in which this proposal in substance is already the law
are Ohio and Michigan. The proposal has been endorsed by those who are
familiar with its operation in Ohio and Michigan. No adverse criticism or
proposal for repeal has been observed.
The American Bar Association, after extensive investigation, has recommended the adoption of the principle of this proposal.
The proposal may reasonably be expected, in the case of an innocent defendant with a sound alibi, to save both him and the state the trouble and
expense of a trial. The proposal may also be counted upon to discourage
the perjury and the other surprise tactics which frequently accompany the
alibi defense in our trial courts. This has proved to be the result of the
statute in Ohio.
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The principal objection which is made against this proposal is that it
obliges the defendant to disclose his defense prior to the trial. It may be
answered however that this argument was the principal argument raised
against the requirement that the defense of insanity be made known before
trial.
Proposal3. Indictments and affidavits shall be subject to liberal rules of
amendment.
Indiana statutes in regard to criminal pleading were liberalized more than
twenty-five years ago. Considerable time is still required in the courts, however, for the discussion of objections to the form or substance of indictments
and affidavits, and technical defects frequently result in a dismissal or acquittal of a guilty defendant. Provision should be made for the amendment of
an indictment or affidavit which would prevent a miscarriage of justice. The
following Ohio statute could well be copied in this state (Section 13437-29,
Laws of Ohio 113-1929):
"The court may at any time before, during or after the trial amend the
indictment or affidavit (information or bill of particulars) in respect to any
defect, imperfection or omission in form or substance, or of any variance
with the evidence, provided no change is made in the name or identity of the
crime charged. If any amendment be made to the substance of the indictment or affidavit (information) or to cure a variance between the indictment
or affidavit (information) and the proof, the accused shall on his motion be
entitled to a discharge of the jury, if a jury has been impaneled, and to a
reasonable continuance of the cause, unless it shall clearly appear from the
whole proceedings that he has not been misled or prejudiced by the defect
or variance in respect to which the amendment is made, or that his rights
will be fully protected by proceeding with the trial, or by a postponement
thereof to a later day with the same or another jury. In case a jury shall be
discharged from further consideration of a case under this section, the
accused shall not be deemed to have been in jeopardy. No action of the
court in refusing a continuance or postponement under this section shall be
reviewable except after motion to and refusal by the trial court to grant a new
trial therefor, and no writ of error or other appeal based upon such action of
the court shall be sustained, nor reversal had, unless from consideration of
the whole proceedings, the reviewing court shall find that the accused was
prejudiced in his defense or that a failure of justice resulted."
Proposal 4. For purposes of appeal exceptions to instructions shall be
taken at the bar.before the retirement of the jury.
Under the present law a defendant may take a general exception to an
instruction to the jury without pointing out the supposed defect. Many cases
are reversed where the defect, if pointed out by the defendant at the time,
could have been cured by the trial court. The practice in the Federal courts
requires such a specific objection, although there the instructions may be and
usually are oral, so that there are some objections to the practice. Under the
present Indiana practice, however, the judge may be required to give only
written instructions and to settle them prior to the argument so that ample
opportunity is afforded a defendant to prepare specific objections. It is therefore recommended that the present law giving the defendant the privilege
of requiring written instructions to be settled prior to the argument be
retained but that a statute require the defendant to make a specific objection
before an exception to an instruction given will be reviewed by the courts of
appeal.
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Proposal5. The jury system should be amended to provide (1) that the
court shall conduct the examination of the jurors, and (2) that provisions
may be made for alternatejurors.
The present situation is such that public confidence and participation in
the work of the petit jury is not as extensive as it should-be. This situation
is due not so much to inherent weaknesses of the jury system as it is to the
misuse of the system. It is a common belief that there is great waste of time
and money because of the extended questioning of jurors by counsel in the
process of impaneling the jury. In capital cases many days are consumed
in excusing jurors because of their attitude on the death penalty. If the
questioning of the jurors is placed primarily in the judge, and if the jury is
relieved of sentencing powers, much waste of time and money may be avoided.
There is also a serious loss in cases where a juror becomes disabled during a
protracted trial. The proposals for the amendment of the present laws are:
(1)

American Law Institute Code:

Section 275, Examination of jurors. (1) The jurors shall be sworn,
either individually or collectively, as the court may decide, to answer truthfully all questions put to them regarding their competence to serve as jurors.
The court shall then examine each juror individually, except that, with the
consent of both parties, it may examine the jurors collectively. The court
in its discretion may permit either party to question a juror and each party
may also submit questions to the court which in its discretion it may ask a
juror. (2) If the court after the examination of any juror is of the opinion
that he is incompetent the court shall excuse him from the trial of the cause.
If, however, the court does not excuse the juror, either party may then challenge him as hereinafter provided.
(2)

American Law Institute Code:

Section 285. Alternate jurors. Whenever in the opinion of the court
the trial is likely to be a protracted one, the court may, immediately after the
jury is impaneled and sworn, direct the calling of one or two additional
jurors, to be known as "alternate jurors." Such jurors shall be drawn from
the same source, and in the same manner, and have the same qualifications as
regular jurors, and be subject to examination and challenge as such jurors,
except that each party shall be allowed one peremptory challenge to each
alternate juror. The alternate jurors shall take the proper oath or affirmation and shall be seated near the regular jurors with equal facilities for seeing
and hearing the proceedings in the cause, and shall attend at all times upon
the trial of the cause in company with the regular jurors. They shall obey all
orders and admonitions of the court, and if the regular jurors are ordered
to be kept in the custody of an officer during the trial of the cause, the
alternate jurors shall also be kept with the other jurors and, except as hereinafter provided, shall be discharged upon the final submission of the cause,
to the jury. If, before the final submission of the cause, a regular juror dies,
(is found to be disqualified), or is discharged, the court shall order the alternate juror, .if there is but one, to take his place in the jury. If there are two
alternate jurors the court shall select one by lot, who shall then take his place
in the jury. After an alternate juror is in the jury he shall be subject to
the same rules as a regular juror.
Proposal 6.
prohibited.

The selection of jurors from the bystanders should be
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Under the present law if a jury panel is exhausted the sheriff may summon
additional jurors from the bystanders. This leaves open a door to fraud and
partiality which undoubtedly results in the acquittal of some guilty defendants. It is, therefore, recommended that the present law be amended to
carry out this suggestion.
Proposal7. Sections five and six of the so-called Hartsell Act should be
repeated. (Chapter 54, Acts 1929.)
This Act deals with the more serious criminal offenses, and in the Sections
referred to provides that the jury shall not find the defendant guilty of a
lesser offense than the offense charged in the indictment. Under the law
prior to this Act the jury might find the defendant guilty of a lesser offense.
The penalties imp6sed by the Act are very severe and experience has demonstrated that in some instances a jury has released an obviously guilty defendant rather than find him guilty and subject to the severe penalties of the
Act; whereas, it is quite likely that the jury would have rendered a verdict
against the defendant upon a lesser offense. It is quite clear that so long as
criminal cases are triable by jury, that the very severity of a penalty may
defeat a conviction, and for that reason it seems desirable to repeal the above
provisions.
Proposal 8. Provision should be inade for the service of summons in
some criminal cases.
Under the present procedure a defendant may only be subjected to the
jurisdiction of a criminal court by arrest. In a great many instances, particularly in the field of misdemeanors, this is an unnecessary hardship upon
the defendant. There is little reason why he should simply not be notified
to appear in court as in a civil case. The code of original procedure recommended by the American Law Institute contains excellent provisions covering
this subject matter, and it is recommended that the substance of these provisions be enacted in this State. Those provisions are as follows:
§ 12. When summons shall be issued. (1) Where the complaint is for
the commission of an offense which the magistrate is empowered to try summarily he shall issue a summons instead of a warrant of arrest, unless he has
reasonable ground to believe that the person against whom the complaint was
made will not appear upon a summons, in which case he shall issue a warrant
of arrest.
(2) Where the complaint is for a misdemeanor, which the magistrate is
not empowered to try summarily, he shall issue a summons instead of a warrant of arrest, if he has reasonable ground to believe that the person against
whom the complaint was made will appear upon a summons.
(3)
The summons shall set forth substantially the nature of the offense,
and shall command the person against whom the complaint was made to
appear before the magistrate issuing the summons at a time and place stated
therein.
§ 13. How summons served. The.summons may be served in the same
manner as the summons in a civil action.
§ 14. Effect of not answering summons. If the person summoned fails.
without good cause, to appear as commanded by the summons, he shall be
considered in contempt of court, and may be punished by a fine of not more
than twenty dollars. Upon such failure to appear the magistrate shall issue
a warrant of arrest. If after issuing a summons the magistrate becomes satis-
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fled that the person summoned will not appear as commanded by the summons he may at once issue a warrant of arrest.
§ 15. Summons against corporation. Upon complaint against a corporation for the commission of an offense, the magistrate before whom the complaint is made shall issue a summons which shall recite substantially the
nature of the offense and shall command the corporation to appear before him
at a time and place stated therein.
§ 16. Service of summons against corporation. The summons for the
appearance of a corporation may be served in the manner provided for service
upon a corporation in a civil action.
§ 17. Effect of failure by corporation to answer syjtnons. If, after
being summoned, the corporation does not appear, a plea of not guilty shall
be entered by the magistrate if he is empowered to try the offense for which
the summons was issued, and he shall proceed to trial and judgment without
further process. If the magistrate is not empowered to try the offense he
shall proceed as though the corporation had appeared.
Proposal 9. Provision should be made for the preservation and admission in evidence of proceedings before a committing judge.
Under the present procedure a defendant charged with a felony may be
examined before a justice of the peace or judge of the Municipal Court to
determine his probable guilt. The defendant cannot be compelled to testify
at such a hearing, but it frequently happens that he does testify and that
other valuable evidence is produced which would be of material assistance in
the subsequent trial of the case in the original court. Likewise other witnesses may give valuable evidence which is later unavailable. At present
there is no provision for the preservation and admissibility of the evidence
obtained at this preliminary hearing, and in fact, the preliminary hearing
is seldom had as the defendant may be proceeded against in the first interest
in the criminal court at the election of the prosecuting attorney. If provision were made as suggested above the evidence of witnesses who were unavailable at the time of the trial would be preserved and admissions which
the defendant might have made would be available without the usual objection
that they had been obtained by fraud or duress. The preliminary hearing
could thus be effectively used in a good many cases as a means of discovering
evidence, of obtaining admissions from the defendant and also of protecting
.witnesses. If the latter have already testified and their testimony is preserved
for use on the trial there would be little to be gained by intimidation and
removal of such a witness prior to trial. The American Law Institute Code
of Criminal procedure contains excellent provisions covering this subject
matter.
Proposal 10. The present law as to change of venue should be modified.
Under the present law a defendant charged with a crime punishable by
death has a right as a matter of course to a change of venue. It is not deemed
advisable to deprive such a defendant of his right, if he in good faith feels
that he may not obtain a fair trial in the county in which the case is pending.
The right, however, at the present time is abused and a change of venue is
used for delay. To remedy this situation it is recommended that every application for a change of venue in a criminal case be accompanied by a certificate,
signed by the defendant and the defendant's counsel, that the defense is ready
for trial; that the change of venue has not been asked for delay; and that the
defense waives the right of seeking any continuance when the case is set for
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trial in the second county. A statute should then also provide that the clerk
should immediately certify and deliver a transcript of the record of the case
to the second county and that upon its receipt there it should be set for trial
within thirty days and given precedence over the other business in the court,
and if this were impossible that the judge should certify that fact to the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court who should appoint a judge from another
county to hear the case.
F.

SUMMIARY.

To summarizeA. In the interest of the taxpayers, the sub-committee recommends that the
general Committee advocate:
1. That the State Board of Accounts be charged with the duty of enforcing compliance by county officials with the State Budget Law in order
that adequate statistics as to the cost of the administration of justice may be
made available.
2. That judges be available, if needed, for trial work within their circuits
for at least forty-eight weeks during the year.
3. That the judicial circuits within the State of Indiana be redefined by
the Legislature, in accordance with the sub-committee's recommendations, and
that certain Superior Courts be abolished.
4. That the statutes be amended to provide that there shall be but one
court reporter for each judge, whether the judge preside over a Circuit, Superior, Probate, Criminal, Juvenile or Municipal Court, and that such reporter's salary may be fixed by the Board of County Commissioners, but at
a maximum amount of not to exceed Eighteen Hundred Dollars ($1800)
per year, with the understanding that compensation of the reporter for preparing transcripts for litigants shall be in addition to such salary.
5. That the three statutes now in force relating to the pay of bailiffs be
repealed and that a new statute be enacted providing that there shall be but
one bailiff for each judge, whether the judge be a judge of a Circuit, Superior,
Probate, Criminal, Juvenile or Municipal Court, and that bailiffs shall be paid
a salary to be fixed by the Board of County Commissioners, but that the
maximum salary which may be fixed shall be One Hundred Dollars per
month.
6. That the Legislature amend the statute relating to taxable costs
assessable for services rendered by the County Clerk by increasing the amount
of such costs to make them more nearly commensurate with the actual outlay
of the County for such services.
7. That a statute be enacted requiring each plaintiff in a civil case pending in a Circuit, Superior or Probate Court to make a cash deposit of fifteen
Dollars in advance to apply against the costs in the trial court (except the
cost of the jury hereinafter covered by separate recommendations), and that
upon such deposit being exhausted by charges, requiring an additional deposit in a like amount before the case proceeds.
8. That a statute be enacted requiring of each plaintiff in a civil case in
the Marion Municipal Court and in other city courts of the state the advance
deposit of the sum of Five Dollars, and such additional Five Dollars deposited in advance as may be necessitated by the exhaustion of said deposit,
as more specifically recommended herein.
9. That a statute be enacted providing that the judges of Municipal and
city courts shall not have the power to suspend the payment of costs assessed
against a convicted defendant in a criminal case.

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN INDIANA

B.

In the interest of litigants in civil cases, the sub-committee recommends:

1. That the statutes be amended to restrict the right of change of venue
from the county to cases involving a jury trial, and to provide that in case a
change of venue is asked by a party after a request for a jury trial by the
opposite party, the party requesting such change be required to furnish a
cost bond to cover all costs incurred in such trial court.
2. That our statutes be amended to provide that in case a change of
venue from the judge is asked in a case not triable by jury, the chief justice
of the Supreme Court shall designate a judge of another Circuit or Superior
Court, whose docket is not crowded, to hear the cause, and in event all other
judges are too busily occupied to do so, the chief justice of the Supreme Court
shall name three lawyers to act, and the parties shall strike, as at the present
time.
3. That provision be made by statute for a procedure which will allow a
summary judgment to be obtained in certain classes of cases.
4. That by statute, terms be abolished.
5. That by statute, the collection of money judgments should be facilitated by allowing attachments against resident defendants; by permitting the
court, by ex parte order, to dispense with the requirement that plaintiff give
an attachment bond in certain types of cases; to extend the power of injunction against the transfer of property in pending litigation or at the time
judgment is obtained; and to expand the scope of proceedings supplementary
to execution by making it unnecessary for the judgment creditor to show
probable cause for believing that the judgment debtor has property subject to
execution, to permit semi-annual examinations of the judgment debtor and to
permit examination of third parties who, it is believed, have in their possession property belonging to, or are indebted to, the judgment debtor; and to
provide a fee system to compensate the sheriffs for the collection of judgments.
6. That by statute the power to make changes in civil and criminal procedure be transferred to the Supreme Court in the exercise of its rule making
powers, subject to the proviso that the Supreme Court shall not have the right
to reduce the amount of costs prescribed by the Legislature nor impair the
security required by the Legislature for the payment of such costs.
7. That by statute, a judicial council be created having broad powers
-to investigate and collect statistics with respect to the administration of
justice in the State of Indiana; to make recommendations to the Supreme
Court of *desirable changes in procedure, to the Legislature of desirable
changes in court organization, and other matters, and to the Governor with
respect to appointed personnel.
C.

In the interest of the general public, the sub-committee recommends:

1. That the Legislature, by proper enactments, provide for the selection
of judges of courts created by the Legislature, viz., Appellate, Superior,
Criminal, Probate and Juvenile Courts, by appointment by the Governor; that
consideration be given to the possibility of requiring such appointments to be
made from a list of lawyers found by a judicial council to be qualified to fill
such offices; that such appointments be during good behavior; and that such
judges should be removable by impeachment only.
2. As a long-time objective involving the adoption of a Constitutional
amendment, that the Legislature propose a Constitutional amendment permitting the similar appointment and tenure for Circuit Court judges and
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providing in the amendment that the compensation of any judge shall not be
diminished directly or indirectly by the State of Indiana during his tenure of
office.
3. That by statute, the Legislature prescribe a small claims procedure in
Municipal and City Courts, adequate to redress minor civil wrongs which
today necessarily go unredressed because of the expense and time involved in
putting the machinery of justice in motion, which makes it unprofitable to
attempt to enforce a legal right where small amounts are involved.
4. That a constitutional amendment be proposed increasing the number
of Supreme Court judges from 5 to 11, thus making it possible to eliminate the
Appellate Court.
5. That the statutes on the sentencing of criminals be revised, depriving
the jury of the power to determine the length of sentence, and providing for
a minimum and maximum sentence in all cases, the length of the term to
be finally determined by the Parole Board, except in capital cases.
6. That the Code of Criminal Procedure be amended to carry into effect
the ten proposals outlined above.
The sub-committee has made some effort to estimate the savings involved.
The sub-committee estimates that by re-defining of judicial circuits, by elimination of certain Superior Courts, by fixing maximum salaries for bailiffs
and reporters, savings of at least One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars
($150,000) will result. By requiring an advance deposit to cover costs, a
minimum of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000) a year will
be saved for the taxpayers in the operation of the courts of general jurisdiction throughout the state, and by requiring similar deposits in Municipal and
City and Mayors' courts, an additional sum of not less than One Hundred
Thousand Dollars ($100,000) would be saved, of w;hich more than half
would be in the Municipal Court of Marion County alone. By increasing the
fees payable for the services of the county clerk to make them more nearly
in conformity with the expense of the services rendered by such clerk, and
by assessing as costs, in event of jury trials, a sum which will be more nearly
in conformity with the cost of the jury, a substantial additional saving for
the taxpayers would be effected, the exact amount of which is conjectural
but, on any basis, should be Two Hundred Thousand Dollars per year. This
makes a total estimated savings of approximately Six Hundred Thousand
Dollars. No recommendations made by the sub-committee involve any expenditures which are not now being made, except the expense of a small
force of employees for a Judicial Council and a small sum to cover the actual
traveling and other expenses of members of the Judicial Council in performing their duties. The sub-committee believes that these savings could be
effected without impairing in any way the efficiency of the service which the
courts render to litigants, and without sacrifice of the respect which the public
has for our courts.
The sub-committee transmits herewith for the information of the Committee the statistics gathered by Mr. Ralph 0. Jarvis, as "Appendix A," and
the proposed Indiana Bar Association bill as "Appendix B."
G.
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The problems of title-drafting necessitate, by way of introduction, a short
historical sketch and a brief consideration of the judicial interpretation of
constitutional provisions concerning the requirement of titles for statutes.
Various methods of title-drafting have been practiced. At first, neither
bills nor statutes were titled. When titles were first introduced, they were
merely an expression by a clerk of the Legislature, or other scrivener, of his
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